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Consumption Property in the Sharing
Economy
Shelly Kreiczer-Levy*
Abstract
Various doctrines from different areas of the law provide special legal
protection for property that is produced and used for personal use, creating
the legal category of “consumption property.” Zoning, criminal procedure,
discrimination, foreclosure and bankruptcy, taxes, and eminent domain all
treat property for consumption differently than commercial property.
Recently, a new social phenomenon known as the sharing economy allows
owners to rent out personal assets such as a room in their home, their
private car, a bicycle, and even pets. The sharing economy challenges the
foundational distinction between privately used property and commercial
property and leads to fragmentation of uses and symbolic meanings. This
fragmentation raises new questions: What are the boundaries of intimacy in
the realm of modern consumption? How should the law regulate business
transactions in intimate locations? This Article presents the category of
personal consumption property, argues that the sharing economy profoundly
challenges it, and then offers new ways to reinvent this category by
introducing the framework of consumption property as a nexus of
connections. The new framework also has numerous legal implications
ranging from fair housing law and public accommodations law to taxes,
business licenses, and other regulatory regimes.
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Gideon Parchomovsky, Ronit Kedar, Roy Kreitner, Joe Singer, and participants at the Israeli Young
Faculty Forum, the Association of Law, Property and Society at Georgia Law School, and the
Progressive Property workshop at Trento University for very helpful comments and suggestions.
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INTRODUCTION

A significant distinction in the law differentiates between property that
is designed, produced, and purchased for private consumption and personal
use and commercial property, a platform for multiple transactions and
exchange.1 This distinction—though not often mentioned or discussed2—
has proven influential in shaping legal doctrines in property, criminal
procedure, zoning, and privacy law.3 Loosely affiliated with the personhood
theory,4 and based on values such as self-development, freedom, autonomy,
and privacy, certain types of private property have received special treatment
and enhanced legal protection,5 creating the category of “consumption
1. See infra Part II.
2. A distinction between privately used consumption property and productive property was
made by Adolf Berle to warn against the concentration of productive property in the hands of
corporations. The focus of the claim is on productive property and the perils of the corporation. See
ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
xxiii, xxviii-xxix (rev. ed. 1991); Adolf A. Berle, Property, Production and Revolution, 65 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 3 (1965); see also infra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
3. See infra Parts II, IV.
4. See infra notes 52–63 and accompanying text.
5. See infra Part II.
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property.” This distinction between personal consumption and commercial
property is not only based on their different contribution to human values,
but is also rooted in the foundational dichotomies between the intimate and
commercial, the private and public, the personal and impersonal.6
Recently, a new economic phenomenon has been gradually changing the
rules of the game.7 The sharing economy has taken the media, social
networks, and public discourse by storm.8 It is an alternative form of
consumption based on collaboration in the production, creation, or use of
products and services.9 With that collaboration now simplified and
redefined by technological advances and online communication, people are
able to share, barter, lend, rent, swap, and gift10 their property. The sharing
economy allows owners to rent out assets such as a car, a home, a bicycle, or
even pets to strangers using new forms of peer-to-peer markets.11 As a
social trend, the sharing economy is gaining momentum.12 Forbes estimated
3.5 billion dollars in revenue flowed through the sharing economy in 2013.13
Airbnb, a site that allows people to rent out houses for short-term periods,
has facilitated over two million room rentals since its foundation in 2008
according to one estimate.14 In addition, it currently includes more than 1.5
million listings in 190 countries and 34,000 cities.15 Car sharing sites, such
6. See infra Part II.
7. See BETH BUCZYNSKI, SHARING IS GOOD: HOW TO SAVE MONEY, TIME, AND RESOURCES
THROUGH COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION 2 (2013).
8. See RACHEL BOTSMAN & ROO ROGERS, WHAT’S MINE IS YOURS: THE RISE OF
COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION (2010) (discussing the sharing economy); Rachel Botsman, The
Case for Collaborative Consumption, TED (May 2010), http://www.ted.com/talks/rachel_botsman_
the_case_for_collaborative_consumption?language=en; see also BUCZYNSKI, supra note 7, at 2.
9. See BUCZYNSKI, supra note 7, at 2.
10. BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 8, at xv; see BUCZYNSKI, supra note 7, at 2.
11. Peer-to-peer (P2P) markets are markets where trade occurs between peers. See, e.g.,
Anindya Ghose, Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis & Arun Sundararajan, Reputation Premiums in Electronic
Peer-to-Peer Markets: Analyzing Textual Feedback and Network Structure, PROC. ACM SIGCOMM
2005
3D
WORKSHOP
ON
ECON.
PEER-TO-PEER
SYSTEMS
(2005),
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1080207.
12. See BUCZYNSKI, supra note 7, at 2.
13. Tomio Geron, Airbnb and the Unstoppable Rise of the Share Economy, FORBES (Jan. 23,
2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/01/23/airbnb-and-the-unstoppablerise-of-the-share-economy/.
14. Benjamin G. Edelman & Michael Luca, Digital Discrimination: The Case of Airbnb.com 2
(Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 14-054, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2377353#%23.
15. About Us, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us (last visited Nov. 1, 2015). For
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as RelayRides and Getaround, are also gradually gaining popularity.
RelayRides is available in 2,300 cities and 300 airports.16 Other sites
facilitate sharing of household possessions, tools, and bikes.17
The growing success of such collaborative consumption enterprises calls
into question the foundational distinction between privately used property
and commercial property.18 If people rent out their homes, cars, bikes, drills,
and ladders for money, these properties are possibly no longer personally
and individually used.19 As privately used property becomes a site for
commercial transactions, presumably there is reason to question its
contribution to self-development, autonomy, privacy, and intimacy. The
conceptual framework of consumption is fragmented into discrete units of
use with different symbolic meanings that include consumption and
production.20 This fragmentation raises new challenges to longstanding
legal doctrines: What are the boundaries of property’s intimacy in the realm
of modern consumption? How should the law regulate business transactions
in intimate locations?
Furthermore, consumers who prefer to use—rather than own—a car, a
drill, or a bike challenge the perception that possession of property reflects
and shapes personhood and contributes to self-development and autonomy.21
Traditional conceptualizations of typical personal possessions are becoming
less relevant to new patterns of use, consumption, and production.22 Their
long-established core as protecting privacy and freedom becomes
fragmented, exposed, and in need of a new legal framework.23 This Article
presents the conceptual challenge to the distinction and offers an improved
vision for the category.

different estimates, see Edelman & Luca, supra note 14, at 2.
16. Yuliya Chernova, Peer-to-Peer Car Rental Startup RelayRides Hopes to Escape Silicon
Valley Bubble, WALL STREET J. (June 14, 2014, 9:27 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2014/
06/24/peer-to-peer-car-rental-startup-relayrides-hopes-to-escape-silicon-valley-bubble/.
17. See NEIGHBORGOODS, neighborgoods.net (last visited Nov. 1, 2015).
18. This Article does not deal with all types of sharing economy transactions, as Part III explains.
19. Cf. Nicole Stelle Garnett, On Castles and Commerce: Zoning Law and the Home-Business
Dilemma, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191, 1211 (2001) (discussing the challenge that home
businesses pose to the traditional concept of the home).
20. See infra Part IV.A.
21. On deconstructing legal categories see J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal
Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 744 (1987).
22. See infra Part V.
23. See infra Part V.
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Responses to the challenges prompted by the sharing economy could
lead down one of two potential paths. A possible course of action is to
constrain the phenomenon by means of legal regulation in order to restore
traditional categories.24 This path was chosen by several local governments
in an attempt to make certain collaborative consumption transactions
illegal.25 A second path is to dismiss the distinction between commercial
and personal consumption property altogether.26 According to this view, a
consumption property category is obsolete in this era of collaborative
consumption; therefore, sharing economy transactions should be treated as
commercial transactions for all intents and purposes.27 This Article argues
in favor of a third approach, which strives to reconstruct the category and its
boundaries.28 Although the current distinction is inaccurate, arcane, and
strict, at its core it has some explanatory and justificatory force.
Distinguishing among different assets based on their contribution to
autonomy, dignity, or freedom is what typifies a rich and nuanced legal
system.
Instead of dismissing the category, this Article calls for its reinvention.29
Rather than focusing on the intimate-commercial dichotomy, this new
conceptualization of the personal consumption property category is sensitive

24. See OFF. OF THE N.Y. ATT’Y GEN., AIRBNB IN THE CITY (Oct. 2014), http://www.ag.ny.gov/
pdfs/AIRBNB%20REPORT.pdf.
25. See id.; Julie Bort, Airbnb: 124 New York Airbnb Hosts “May Be Flagrantly Misusing Our
Platform”, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/airbnb-gives-ag-info-on124-ny-hosts-2014-8; see also Lauren Frayer, Uber, Airbnb Under Attack in Spain as Old and New
Economies Clash, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 29, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2014/
07/29/327796899/uber-airbnbunder-attack-in-spain-as-old-and-new-economy-clash (describing the
tension between tourism and taxi drivers’ associations attempts to regulate “share economy” services
and the individuals who rely on such services for primary or additional income); Brian Summers,
Airbnb’s Short-Term Rentals Break Law in Los Angeles, Says City Memo, DAILY BREEZE (Mar. 21,
2014), http://www.dailybreeze.com/business/20140321/airbnbs-short-term-rentals-break-law-in-losangeles-says-city-memo; Brad Tuttle, 7 Cities Where the Sharing Economy Is Freshly Under Attack,
TIME (June 9, 2014), http://time.com/money/2800742/uber-lyft-airbnb-sharingeconomy-cityregulation.
26. On challenges to legal categories, and subsequently, suggestion to dismiss the category see
infra notes 244–438 and accompanying text.
27. Cf. Adrian Glick Kudler, LA Airbnb Landlords Going to Have to Start Paying Their Taxes,
L.A. CURBED (Sept. 9, 2014), http://la.curbed.com/archives/2014/09/la_airbnb_landlords_going_to_
have_to_start_paying_their_taxes.php (stating that Los Angeles will begin collecting hotel taxes
from Airbnb hosts).
28. See infra Part VI.
29. See infra Part VI.
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to the complexity of human interactions and economic activities. Personal
consumption property should be understood as an intermediate environment
between the private, secluded, homogenous—and hence intimate—space
and the public, regulated, commercial space.30 The promise of an
intermediate space lies in the possibilities it affords: new types of
transactions and interactions and a unique set of personal and social benefits
and costs.
The idea of a nexus of connections allows individuals to shape their
personal space and provides an opportunity to engage with different
people—friends, neighbors, strangers, and the community at large—in a
variety of ways, including altruistic gift giving, commercial exchange, and
the many shades of gray in between. Of course, the potential is not always
fulfilled. The sharing economy is an intricate phenomenon that warrants a
careful approach, one that appreciates both its potential and its risks.31
This vision supports a new legal framework. It advocates a complex set
of legal rules that focus on the unique attributes of an intermediate space,
instead of banning the sharing economy,32 regulating transactions such as
commercial property,33 or otherwise ignoring the activity.34 This vision
suggests that the values that underlie the category, namely intimacy,
personhood, privacy, and dignity, should be reconfigured to fit the era of
modern consumption. Because the distinction between consumption and
commercial property centers on use,35 the law should reflect how multiple
forms of use manipulate the values that various doctrines set out to protect.36
The role of intimacy, autonomy, or privacy is different across legal
doctrines, such as local regulation, eminent domain, insurance, fair housing,
and public accommodations.
Some doctrines remain untouched by changing patterns of use as long as

30. See infra Part V.
31. See infra notes 149–55 and accompanying text.
32. See Frayer, supra note 25.
33. See Kudler, supra note 27.
34. Cf. Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, But for Local Governmental Policy:
The Future of Local Regulation of the “Sharing Economy” 1 (Jan. 14, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2549919 (stating that there is an
assumption that “if the sharing firms win these fights, their future will be largely free from
government regulation,” but then arguing that this assumption is “almost surely wrong”).
35. See infra Part III.B.
36. See infra Part VI.
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the core use is personal.37 Yet, many other doctrines are still based on the
assumption of consumption property as an intimate location. Consider, for
example, the case of fair housing.38 In 2012, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that the Fair Housing Act39 did not apply to shared living
situations and, hence, neither to advertisements seeking roommates.40 The
decision was based on the privacy of relationships inside the home and the
right to intimate association.41 In intimate locations, owners hold the
prerogative to choose with whom to share their property.42 The sharing
economy introduces short-term multiple rentals, thereby blurring the
distinction between a business transaction and an intimate choice of a longterm roommate.43 This changes the meaning and function of intimacy in
property law. Intimate locations, such as the home, the car, and personal
items, are no longer limited to sharing with close relations, but may include
commercial interactions with strangers.44 Yet anti-discrimination rules still
generally assume that consumption property precludes commercial
transactions.45 The new conceptualization provides a more nuanced account
of the category and the doctrines that support it.
This Article provides guidelines to distinguish among different legal
doctrines that support the consumption property category.46 In addition, two
types of legal doctrines are discussed in depth: (1) the boundaries of freedom
of intimate association in property transactions, namely fair housing and
public accommodation law, and (2) taxation and regulation.47
Part II defines the category of personal consumption property and its
legal significance, setting the boundaries for our exploration. In explaining
the contours of this category, this Article will present it at its best,
highlighting its most compelling arguments. As the argument of this Article
37. See infra notes 444–500 and accompanying text.
38. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 666 F.3d 1216, 1216
(9th Cir. 2012).
39. Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–19 (2012).
40. Fair Hous. Council, 666 F.3d at 1222.
41. Id. at 1220–21.
42. See infra Part VI.A.
43. See infra notes 148–55 and accompanying text.
44. See BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 8, at xii.
45. For public accommodation laws see Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public
Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1448 (1995).
46. See infra Part VI.
47. See infra Part VI.
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progresses, critiques of the category will be introduced and discussed. In
addition, as we will see, not all types of consumption property receive the
same protection or equally contribute to values such as autonomy,
personhood, or freedom. The home is probably the strongest example of the
category; it is revered by various doctrines and theories and understood as a
shelter and a safe haven from the outside world.48 It will thus serve as a
paradigmatic example throughout this Article. Other personal consumption
properties might be less central to legal theory and practice, but still build on
the assumption of private use.
Part III presents the sharing economy phenomenon, distinguishing
between major types of sharing economy and elaborating on the function of
sharing sites such as Airbnb, car sharing sites, and NeighborGoods, which
serve as prototypical examples of this Article’s argument. Part IV then
explains the challenge the sharing economy poses to personal consumption
property. By contrasting two seemingly antithetical concepts—the home
and the hotel—this Part details the rise and fall of the home as a pure shelter,
detached from business and commercial interaction, and the fragmentation
of the concept of the home into multiple uses. It also discusses the access
revolution and consumers’ preference to bargain for localized short-term use
rather than own property. Part V reinvents the category of personal
consumption property as an intermediate space, a platform for various
relations borrowing from theories of public space and urban planning. It
explains the connection between the sharing economy, home, public space,
and urban planning. Part VI explores the legal implications of the analysis.
Finally, Part VII offers concluding remarks.
II. PERSONAL CONSUMPTION PROPERTY: THE SELF AND BEYOND
A central legal distinction is the divide between property that is
designed and purchased for personal use and commercial property. While
the latter is exchanged for monetary value, the possession of the former
property involves, in some cases, self-development, autonomy, freedom, and
privacy.49 The distinction between these two categories is not explicit, but is
supported by a number of theories and doctrines, as this Part details.50

48. See infra notes 80–81, 103 and accompanying text.
49. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959–60 (1982).
50. See infra notes 148–264 and accompanying text.
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Although each of these rules employs different justifications for the
distinction, and therefore slightly different divisions, taken together they
reflect a clear legal classification system.
First of all, the distinction evokes Margaret Radin’s seminal work on
property and personhood.51 Radin argued that people need to hold certain
possessions in order to achieve self-development.52 She distinguished
between fungible assets that do not warrant special protection and
personhood property, suggesting “a hierarchy of entitlements: [t]he more
closely connected with personhood, the stronger the entitlement.”53 A key
example is the home.54 The home is closely connected to personhood,
according to Radin, because it is a “scene of one’s history and future, one’s
life and growth.”55 The car is also part of the same list because cars are “the
repository of personal effects, and cars form the backdrop for carrying on
private thoughts or intimate relationships, just as homes do.”56
Property’s role in the achievement of personhood and self-development
is twofold.57 First, people define themselves at least partly by what they
have.58 When a person changes, structures, or uses an object, according to
the claim, she cements her identity in the object.59 She has to acknowledge
her responsibility when she changes the property, since the process is
irreversible.60 Second, objects tell us something about their owners.61
Objects reveal an owner’s likes and dislikes, her tastes and preferences,62 her

51. Radin, supra note 49, at 957.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 986.
54. Id. at 991.
55. Id. at 992.
56. Id. at 1001.
57. Id. (noting the two avenues for answering the normative question of whether an object should
be recognized as a reflection of personhood).
58. Cf. Nestor M. Davidson, Property and Relative Status, 107 MICH. L. REV. 757, 768 (2008)
(“[I]t is clear that between what a man calls me and what he simply calls mine the line is difficult to
draw. We feel and act about certain things that are ours very much as we feel and act about
ourselves . . . .”).
59. JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 372 (1988).
60. Id. at 364–65.
61. See Dudley Knowles, Hegel on Property and Personality, 33 PHIL. Q. 45, 56 (1983) (noting
that people “identify [them]selves through the medium of [their] property and . . . accord others
equivalent status”).
62. Id. at 56–57.
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status in life,63 or the choices she has made.64 Our property says something
about us to the world and, at the same time, helps us shape an image of
ourselves.65 Think of personal possessions, such as clothes, books, and
furniture. These objects allow owners to project their personality outwards
and structure their experiences inwards.66
However, the Radinian distinction focuses on the personal meaning of
an asset, not on its primary function and use.67 The home, car, bike, or
ladder can be used personally without becoming intertwined with one’s
personhood.68 Because personhood theory is essentially subjective,69 it does
not apply equally to similar types of property.70 What the category of
consumption property determines instead is whether the property has been
purchased and designed for personal use or is a platform for commercial
transactions and exchange. To illustrate the point, consider a similar
distinction by Adolf Berle, one of the leading theorists on corporate
governance.71 Berle distinguishes between productive property that is
“devoted to production, manufacture, service[,] or commerce” of goods and
consumption property that is an expression of personality.72 According to
his argument, consumption property protects individual freedom, whereas
productive property represents corporate power and is a threat to freedom.73
Berle recognizes a separation between consumption and production not only
as part of an economic theory, but also as different categories of property.74
But because Berle was primarily concerned with the concentration of

63. Malla Pollack, Your Image Is My Image: When Advertising Dedicates Trademarks to the
Public Domain—with an Example from the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, 14 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1392, 1397–1406 (1993) (describing the significance of consumer goods as a means of
“carry[ing] and communicat[ing] social meaning”).
64. See Davidson, supra note 58, at 799.
65. Id. at 760.
66. See Pollack, supra note 63, at 1430.
67. Radin, supra note 49, at 962.
68. See Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth
Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 927–28 (2010).
69. Id. at 927–28, 927 nn.113–14.
70. See Radin, supra note 49, at 959.
71. See generally AMNON LEHAVI, THE CONSTRUCTION OF PROPERTY: NORMS, INSTITUTIONS,
CHALLENGES 179–85 (2013); Berle, supra note 2.
72. See Berle supra note 2, at 4.
73. LEHAVI, supra note 71, at 180.
74. Id. at 182.
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productive property in the hands of corporations,75 his argument
distinguishes between individual and corporate owners and is less focused
on the type of property.76 Moreover, he was less interested in consumption
property and did not fully develop the category.77
The distinction between consumption and commercial property is also
supported by legal doctrines and further justified by the values of freedom,
privacy, and autonomy. These values justify the special legal protection of
property that is designed for personal consumption rather than business
use.78 The home, as opposed to a house, is the clearest example of this
unique legal treatment.79 The home is perceived in legal scholarship and
case law alike as a special locus for individual autonomy, dignity,80 freedom,
and privacy.81 The home is construed as a place free from the interference of
others,82 and thus the home is treated differently from houses for commercial
use.83 In criminal law, for example, the punishments for invasion of a home
“generally exceed the penalties imposed for invasions of other types of
property.”84 In addition, the Fourth Amendment,85 search and seizure law,
and general case law all reflect a commitment to privacy in the home.86
Another important value supporting the distinction between
consumption and commercial property is intimacy. It is by now almost
75. Berle, supra note 2, at 4; see also LEHAVI, supra note 71, at 180.
76. LEHAVI, supra note 71, at 180–81.
77. Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property, Power, and Freedom: Reich’s “New Property” at Fifty 22,
30–31 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author). In addition, Berle’s distinction does not
accommodate small economic producers and is mainly concerned with the divide between
individuals and corporations. Id. at 23 (noting that Berle “misapprehend[ed] the significance of the
sorts of small economic producers”).
78. See Stern, supra note 68, at 907.
79. The home has an elevated status compared to other kinds of personal property, and it serves
as the prototypical (though not sole) example of the thesis. See Radin, supra note 49, at 991–92.
80. Eduardo Peñalver, Property Metaphors and Kelo v. New London: Two Views of the Castle,
74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2971, 2972–73 (2006).
81. See D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 259
(2006).
82. See Lisa M. Austin, Person, Place, or Thing? Property and the Structuring of Social
Relations, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 445, 450 (2010).
83. Barros, supra note 81, at 259 (“[H]omes are different from other types of property when
issues of personal security, freedom, and privacy are at stake.”). In addition, Radin contends that the
rights of landlord are fungible property. Radin, supra note 49, at 992–94.
84. Barros, supra note 81, at 262.
85. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
86. Barros, supra note 81, at 269–75, 269 n.57, 270 n.58.
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cliché to say that property is a platform of human relations.87 Within this
general claim, consumption property is presumed to foster intimate relations
founded on familiarity, closeness, and trust.88 Sharing one’s home, car, or
books with family members, close friends, and neighbors remains within the
contours of this general paradigm.89 The home is often understood as a site
that hosts intimate relations90 and functions as a social and cultural unit of
interaction between guests, neighbors, and the people living in the home.91
This type of sharing is considered to be part of the extended self92 because
self-development requires intimate relations and social interactions.93
However, commercial property supports a different type of relations, rooted
in arm-length transactions and based on mutual economic interests rather
than personal connections.94 This distinction supports current housing
87. Relational and communal property scholars have similarly argued strongly for an
understanding of property as a platform for relations. See generally Gregory S. Alexander,
Intergenerational Communities, 8 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 21, 21 (2014) (arguing that property
owners owe an obligation to provide future generations with the necessary tools to complete “lifetranscending projects” and future generations have a duty to carry out such projects); Gregory S.
Alexander & Eduardo Peñalver, Properties of Communities, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 127,
127–28 (2009) (discussing the mutual dependence of the individual and their community); Jennifer
Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 162, 162–63 (1991)
(evaluating the boundary-like structure of property law and advocating for a change in the legal
metaphor in order to further human autonomy); Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in
Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 617–18 (1988) (examining society’s reliance on relationships by
analyzing the legal protections and exposures of such reliance interest).
88. Cf. Austin, supra note 82, at 449.
89. See id. at 450 (discussing the home as a site that hosts meaningful intimate relations); see
also Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, The Informal Property Rights of Boomerang Children in the Home, 74
MD. L. REV. 127 (2015) (discussing co-residence as a home-sharing community).
90. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, THE HOUSEHOLD: INFORMAL ORDER AROUND THE HEARTH xi,
1 (reprt. ed. 2008) (defining the household as a “set of institutional arrangements, formal or
informal, that govern relations among the owners and occupants of a particular dwelling space”); see
also Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the Hearth,
116 YALE L.J. 226, 229–30 (2006) (analyzing informal household relations).
91. Lorna Fox, The Meaning of Home: A Chimerical Concept or a Legal Challenge?, 29 J.L. &
SOC’Y 580, 600–01 (2002); Judith Sixsmith, The Meaning of Home: An Exploratory Study of
Environmental Experience, 6 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 281, 291–92 (1986); Sandy G. Smith, The
Essential Qualities of a Home, 14 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 31, 33 (1994); see also Shelley Mallett,
Understanding Home: A Critical Review of the Literature, 52 SOC. REV. 62, 68 (2004) (defining the
home as a “‘socio-spatial system’ that represents the fusion of the physical unit or house and the
social unit or the household”).
92. Russell Belk, Sharing, 36 J. CONSUMER RES. 715, 726–27 (2010).
93. Austin, supra note 82, at 449.
94. See, e.g., Belk, supra note 92, at 719 (implying that a less personal business relationship has
a greater impersonal commodity character than that of a more personal business relationship).
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discrimination and public accommodations regulations, which allows
owners to choose with whom to share their consumption property but
regulates their decision to share in a place of business.95 Although intimacy
as a property value has not been addressed in the literature, it lies at the core
of the consumption property category.96
Another set of legal doctrines celebrates possession of the home as
worthy of special protection. A legal focus on possession supports the
personal consumption aspect of a home, since possession is the primary
personal use of the property.97 Protection of possession of the home has
been justified based on the values of dignity and personhood98 and is
overwhelmingly supported by legal doctrines.99 From bankruptcy100 to postforeclosure rights of redemption101 and just cause eviction rules,102 the law
grants possession of the home preferential protection, so much so that
Stephanie Stern refers to it as “residential protectionism.”103
Although possession of a car, bike, or ladder is not uniquely protected,
the law still singularizes personal property used for private consumption.
Property tax law in most states distinguishes between personal property used
for business purposes and property for personal use.104 Some states limit
tangible property tax to business-related property.105 Other states—such as
Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Montana, and Oklahoma—
95. See infra Part VI.
96. See, e.g., Mallett, supra note 91, at 84 (indicating that the home “can be associated with
feelings of comfort, ease intimacy, relaxation and security and/or oppression, tyranny and
persecution”).
97. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 49, at 990.
98. See infra Part VI.
99. See infra notes 258–70 and accompanying text.
100. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (2012); see also Jay A. Kroese, Undersecured Residential
Mortgage Cramdown Under Chapter 13: Receiving the Attention of Both the Supreme Court and
Congress, 18 J. CORP. L. 737, 764 (1993) (noting that “[h]ome ownership is a highly desirable
societal policy [supported by] the federal government”).
101. See, e.g., Graves v. Wayman, 859 N.W.2d 791, 793 (Minn. 2015) (discussing generally a
homeowner’s exercise of the right of redemption to cancel a foreclosure sale); see also JESSE
DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 618–19 (7th ed. 2010) (discussing the history of the equitable and
statutory rights of redemption).
102. See Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Nunez, 952 N.E.2d 923, 930–31, 933 (Mass. 2011).
103. See Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107
MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1100 (2009); infra Part VI.
104. CCH STATE TAX LAW EDITORS, 2009 U.S. MASTER PROPERTY TAX GUIDE 7, 45–46 (Fred
Conklin ed., 2009).
105. Id.

73

[Vol. 43: 61, 2015]

Consumption Property in the Sharing Economy
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

employ a personal property ad valorem tax, but exempt personal use
property, household goods, or furniture.106 Also, many state laws include
statutory exemptions that limit a creditor’s ability to collect from debtors in
judgment enforcement.107 Some states exempt property for personal use,
such as clothes, books, musical instruments, and furniture.108 Similarly,
federal bankruptcy exemptions include a car, household furniture and goods,
and books that are personally used.109 These exemptions allow debtors to
maintain their dignity and support recuperation for their family.110
To sum up, there are several rules that treat property designed,
purchased, and used for personal consumption differently than other types of
property.111 The category is supported by different justifications, based on
individual values, including personhood, autonomy, and freedom.112 Yet the
individual focus does not exclude cooperation. The idea of sharing is not
foreign to this category. Although altruistic sharing poses no real threat to
the category of personal consumption property, commercial sharing does not
accord with the foundations of the category.113
Indeed, property can be used to extract profit when owners transfer
partial use rights such as licenses or easements to others in exchange for
monetary compensation.114 Depending on the type of transaction and its
effect on possession, exchange value is perceived as antithetical to the
concept of personal consumption property.115 The underlying assumption is
106. Id.
107. JAMES J. BROWN, JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT §§ 10.1, 10.9 (2d ed. 1995 & Supp. 2015).
108. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4902(a) (2015) (including family bible, school books,
family library, family pictures, pianos, and sewing machines among exemptions); see also HAW.
REV. STAT. § 651-121 (2015) (including all necessary household furnishings, appliances, clothing
and books that are used by the debtor and his family as exemptions); BROWN, supra note 107, §§
10.19, 10.24 (examining Kansas and Massachusetts exemptions). But see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §
4902(c) (“This provision shall not apply to persons who keep sewing machines for sale or hire.”).
109. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (2012); BROWN, supra note 107, §§ 10.09–10.
110. BROWN, supra note 107, § 10.09.
111. See supra notes 95–110 and accompanying text.
112. See Austin, supra note 82, at 450.
113. See supra notes 38–58 and accompanying text.
114. See Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Useless Property, 32 CARDOZO. L. REV. 1369, 1375–77, 1388–89
(2011) (arguing that use is derivative of ownership, which is a concept that runs counter to the
current structure of property law).
115. See, e.g., Belk, supra note 92, at 719 (arguing that there is a sliding scale between fungibility
and personal connections with regard to personal property: as the transaction becomes more personal
to the purchaser, such as in cases of secondary goods sold, the good loses its “impersonal commodity
character”). This commodity character affects the value for both the seller and purchaser. Id.
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that personal consumption property is designed and produced for personal,
rather than commercial, use.116 If the property is used to extract significant
exchange value, its unique qualities as personal use property diminish.117
For example, Radin contends that when a homeowner rents her house to a
tenant, the rights of the landlord become fungible property and the
occupational rights of tenants should be characterized as personhood
property instead.118 This explains why mixing commercial and personal use
could prove confusing for this legal category. Conceptually, it turns the
property into something completely different, as Part IV explains.119
Finally, it is important to clarify that the distinction between
consumption and commercial property, while important and pertinent to
current legal reality, is by no means hermetic. Even the most powerful
distinctions have fuzzy edges. One important complexity concerns
homeownership.120 There is a complex interplay between possession,
consumption, and value.121 Most clearly, homeowners consume housing.122
Housing consumption also includes price protection and the options of
Consequently, some argue that
decorating and landscaping.123
homeownership is a form of production of housing services and an
investment in real estate.124 It is clear, however, that homeowners who live
in their home use their property primarily as a source of consumption. In
addition, possession includes personhood values of an asset: the personal
space it affords and its value in securing autonomy, dignity, and privacy for
its possessors.125 This is the added value that supposedly distinguishes
personal possessions from other assets.126

116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Radin, supra note 49, at 992–93.
119. See infra Part IV.
120. See infra notes 122–25 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 122–25 and accompanying text.
122. Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1047, 1054–59 (2008).
123. Id.
124. JAMES M. BUCHANAN, PROPERTY AS A GUARANTOR OF LIBERTY 35 (Charles K. Rowley ed.,
1993); Fennell, supra note 122, at 1054–59.
125. See Fennell, supra note 122, at 1054–59. Fennell bundles these two levels together as the
consumption value of the home as opposed to the home as an investment bundle. Id.
126. Id. at 1054–63.
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III. THE SHARING ECONOMY
A. The Phenomenon: Background and Motivations
It is now time to consider the sharing economy phenomenon and its
social and economic implications. The term “sharing economy” refers to a
variety of economic practices that are based on collaborative forms of
consumption.127 Collaborative consumption is about the “sharing, bartering,
lending, trading, renting, gifting and swapping” of products and services,
simplified and redefined by technological advances and online
communication.128 As the trend gains momentum,129 social advocates
passionately argue that it will revolutionize long-established conventions
about economic production, consumption, and ownership.130 Slogans such
as “usage trumps possession,”131 “access is better than ownership,”132 and
that the sharing economy is “as big as the Industrial Revolution”133 mark the
ambition of such advocates who are dedicated to transforming not only
economic practices but also social processes.
This new trend relies on owners that are willing to share and users that
prefer to use rather than own.134 From the owner’s perspective, there are
certain types of goods that have excess capacity when they are privately
owned and consumed.135 Because the excess capacity is not used, certain
types of goods are systematically underexploited.136 Think of a car, for
example. Suppose someone only uses their car in winter but never in the
summer. During the summer the car is simply parked in the driveway.
Through sites such as Getaround, JustShareIt, and Turo, this person could
benefit from the car’s use value not only in winter, but also in the summer,

127. BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 8, at 71–75.
128. Id. at xv.
129. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text.
130. See infra notes 131–33 and accompanying text.
131. BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 8, at 97–98.
132. Id.
133. See Danielle Sacks, The Sharing Economy, FAST COMPANY (Apr. 18, 2011, 1:05 AM),
http://www.fastcompany.com/1747551/sharing-economy (interviewing Rachel Botsman).
134. Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a
Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 311–13 (2004).
135. Id.
136. Id.
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on Thursdays, or during the evenings.137 Whenever the car is being used, it
can be rented out for money.138 In addition, cars have another untapped
potential. Many commuters drive to work alone, even though their car can
seat four or five passengers. To make use of this excess capacity, car
owners can simply carpool. As of 2003, carpooling was the second-largest
commuter transportation system in the United States.139 The mechanisms for
carpools vary tremendously. They can involve explicit barter, cost
sharing,140 or payments.141 For example, in Northern Virginia and the San
Francisco Bay area, solo drivers are picking up strangers at known meeting
points in order to take advantage of high occupancy vehicle lanes.142
From the user’s perspective, potential users of goods and services prefer
to pay or barter for use of a product, rather than purchase the product.143
Reasons for this preference include obtaining access at a lower cost144 and
the flexibility of using items in different locations, which brings storage
advantages because storage is the owner’s responsibility.145 There are also
social and psychological gains, including making a personal statement that
denies the traditional market ownership model and supports sustainability.146
At the same time, there are also costs associated with sharing: the price of a
shared product, the cost of learning to use unfamiliar products repeatedly,
and the cost of searching for new products.147
In economic terms, new technologies and online markets have
significantly lowered transaction costs for short-term use of personal
assets.148 Reduced costs allow owners and users to benefit from excess
137. See About Us, JUSTSHAREIT, http://www.justshareit.com/jsi/website/about.do (last visited
Nov. 3, 2015); How It Works, GETAROUND, https://www.getaround.com/tour (last visited Nov. 3,
2015); How Turo Works, TURO, https://turo.com/how-turo-works (last visited Nov. 3, 2015).
138. See, e.g., How Turo Works, supra note 137 (discussing how to list one’s car).
139. See Benkler, supra note 134, at 281 (citing John Pucher & John L. Renne, Socioeconomics of
Urban Travel: Evidence from the 2001 NHTS, 57 TRANSP. Q. 49, 53 tbl.3 (2003)).
140. Id. at 282.
141. Id. at 282–83.
142. Id. at 284.
143. Cait Poynor Lamberton & Randall L. Rose, When Is Ours Better Than Mine? A Framework
for Understanding and Altering Participation in Commercial Sharing Systems, 76 J. MARKETING
109, 111 (2012).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See Benkler, supra note 134, at 282–83.
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capacity of the property easily and efficiently.149 Because the sharing
economy is based mostly on contractual arrangements and users typically do
not hold property rights, there is little danger of either overuse or underuse
of the asset. Therefore, the notorious tragedies of the commons150 or the
anticommons,151 resulting from too many owners having privileges of use152
or rights to exclude153 respectively, do not pose real threats here.154
However, the sharing economy can also lead to negative externalities for
neighbors and the community.155
Although the sharing economy is only in its initial stages of
revolutionizing consumption, it is important to study its effect on property
law. First, it continues gaining momentum.156 At this rate, and considering
the very real motivations that support the phenomenon, one can anticipate its
continuing rise. Second, the phenomenon poses a challenge already in these
fairly early stages because it challenges the basic conventions of
consumption and production of individual owners.157
B. Categories in the Sharing Economy
The term sharing economy embraces a wide variety of sharing
transactions.158 The differences are remarkable. In order to make sense of
the phenomenon as well as define the scope of inquiry, I suggest three main
guidelines for characterizing various patterns of sharing. The first principle
distinguishes between transactions that share products and transactions that
provide services.159 Peer-to-peer markets can include owners that share their
property, such as cars, drills, bikes, and houses, or people wishing to share
their time, skills, and expertise via sites like Skillshare160 and TaskRabbit.161
149. Id.
150. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).
151. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in Transition From Marx to
Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998).
152. Hardin, supra note 150.
153. Heller, supra note 151, at 623.
154. See Benkler, supra note 134, at 304–05.
155. See infra note 397 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text.
159. See BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 8, at 71–72.
160. See About Us, SKILLSHARE, https://www.skillshare.com/about (last visited Nov. 3, 2015)
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While sharing skills can be just as revolutionary as sharing property in terms
of consumer behavior, only the latter is innovative in terms of property
theory. The sharing of property—in particular consumption property that is
routinely employed for private use—presents a challenge to key property
theory assumptions, as will be discussed in the next Part.162
The second principle distinguishes between commercial-based sharing
and sharing by private individuals.163 Consider the difference between
Zipcar164 and Turo.165 Both sites provide creative ways to save on
transportation costs.166 Zipcar offers car-sharing services for cars owned by
a commercial company.167 Turo is a peer-to-peer service that allows private
owners to rent their cars.168 Both models reflect consumers’ preferences to
use rather than own, and in this sense they both challenge the premise of
longtime attachment to personal possessions.169 In essence, users reject the
need for continuing entanglement with certain types of property.170 Despite
the similarities from the consumer’s perspective, there is an important
difference between the two business models. Because the owner in Zipcar is
a commercial company, there is no consumption property involved in the
transaction.171 Their cars are business inventory par excellence. In Turo, at
least some of the vehicles available are personal cars rented out by
individual owners when they are not using them.172
A third principle concerns the distinction between payments for goods
(describing how Skillshare is an online learning community designed to help users master real-world
skills through project-based classes). Skillshare’s “mission is to . . . dismantl[e] the traditional
barriers to learning so that anyone, anywhere in the world, can learn whatever they set their minds
to.” Id.
161. See How TaskRabbit Works, TASKRABBIT, https://www.taskrabbit.com/how-it-works (last
visited Nov. 3, 2015) (“TaskRabbit is the smart way to get things done by connecting you with
others in your neighborhood.”). With TaskRabbit, users can outsource errands to a list of taskers
that have been vetted. Id.
162. See infra Part IV.
163. See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text.
164. See How to Zip, ZIPCAR, http://www.zipcar.com/how (last visited Nov. 3, 2015).
165. See TURO, supra note 137.
166. See id.; ZIPCAR, supra note 164.
167. See ZIPCAR, supra note 164.
168. See TURO, supra note 137.
169. See id.; ZIPCAR, supra note 164.
170. See generally Lamberton & Rose, supra note 143 (discussing property entanglement).
171. See ZIPCAR, supra note 164.
172. See TURO, supra note 137.
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or services and bartering, or in-kind swapping. All of the above examples
assume payment in return for use rights or services provided. As part of the
consumption revolution, and following an environmental agenda, many
online sites facilitate swapping in-kind goods. One can swap clothes on
SwapStyle, books on PaperBackSwap, and any other items on Tradeaway.173
Because in-kind swapping is based on barter, the parties to the transaction do
not deal with use rights and the owner does not retain ownership rights.174 It
therefore does not pose a challenge to the legal doctrines framing
consumption property.
To sum up, this Article focuses on a particular type of sharing economy
transaction in order to discuss the clearest challenge to the concept of
consumption property: physical goods that are privately owned and
purchased for individual use, but then shared in exchange for monetary
compensation in peer-to-peer markets.
C. Sharing of Consumption Property
Three types of online sharing sites serve as prototypical examples for
the argument.175 The first is Airbnb.176 The site offers an online tourist
marketplace that allows owners to share their homes for a fee.177 Hosts
usually offer short-term rentals of the home or spare rooms for travelers.178
Airbnb accommodates a vast array of hosting options, including: shared
accommodation where the owner and travelers live under the same roof;
short-term rentals of the entire home when the owners go on vacation; and
rentals of houses and apartments that the hosts do not actually live in.179 At
one end of the spectrum, there are housing units that are not being used as
homes at all and pose little threat to core concepts of consumption property;
173. See How to Swap Books, PAPERBACKSWAP, http://www.paperbackswap.com/help/how_to_
swap_books.php (last visited Nov. 3, 2015); SWAPSTYLE, http://www.swapstyle.com/ (last visited
Nov. 3, 2015); What is Trade or Barter?, TRADEAWAY, http://www.tradeaway.com/abouttrade.php
(last visited Nov. 3, 2015).
174. See Benkler, supra note 134, at 304–05.
175. See infra notes 179–206 and accompanying text.
176. See AIRBNB, supra note 15.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See Georgios Zervas, Davide Proserpio & John W. Byres, The Rise of the Sharing Economy:
Estimating the Impact of Airbnb on the Hotel Industry 26 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Mgmt., Research Paper
No. 2013-16, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2366898.
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however, at the other end there are hosts sharing an intimate space with
strangers and living with travelers.180 The introduction of new touristic
possibilities through Airbnb has blurred the distinction between home and
hotel.181 If the home becomes part of the hospitality sector, is it still a home
at all? If tourists are paying to stay at someone’s home, is it really the same
as a hotel?
The categorization is further complicated by comparison to another
online sharing site called Couchsurfing.182 Couchsurfing also offers
accommodation for travelers, but unlike Airbnb this accommodation is
free.183 The difference between gift exchange and market exchange184
proves significant in terms of visual and discursive analysis185 and in terms
of users’ expectations. In the Couchsurfing community, participants, or
“surfers,” are redefined as friends with a friendship ranking (such as good
friend, close friend, or best friend).186 In contrast, while the personal
dimension is also evident on Airbnb, the site emphasizes the city and rooms
available.187 Additionally, hosts on Couchsurfing are expected to interact
with their guests and show them the city.188 On the other hand, Airbnb
travelers are expected to be relatively independent.189 For these reasons,
Couchsurfing poses less of a threat to the concept of consumption property,
at least in theory. Although it does challenge the social dichotomy between
friends and strangers, it creatively redefines travelers as friends and keeps
sharing within traditional boundaries: altruistic and friendly. This framing
180. Id. at 7–8.
181. Id. at 4–5.
182. Share Your Life, COUCHSURFING, http://www.couchsurfing.com/about/about-us/ (last visited
Oct. 14, 2015).
183. Natalia Yannopoulou, Mona Moufahim & Xuemei Bian, User-Generated Brands and Social
Media: Couchsurfing and Airbnb, 9 CONTEMP. MGMT. RES. 85, 87 (2013).
184. See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 151 (1993); PETER M.
BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE 89 (1964); Barry Schwartz, The Social Psychology of
the Gift, 73 AM. J. SOC. 1, 2 (1967) (discussing the premise of gift exchange); see also Kieran Healy
& Kimberly D. Krawiec, Custom, Contract and Kidney Exchange, 63 DUKE L.J. 645 (2012)
(complicating the distinction between gift and market exchange using the example of kidney
exchange).
185. See Yannopoulou et al., supra note 183, at 85.
186. Id. at 87.
187. Id. at 88.
188. See Tapio Ikkala & Airi Lampinen, Defining the Price of Hospitality: Networked Hospitality
Exchange via Airbnb, CSCW COMPANION 173, 177 (2014).
189. See id. at 176.
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defuses any danger that the home will function as a hotel and longstanding
distinctions are preserved.190
The duality embedded in the market of touristic home sharing has
generated a fierce public debate. In New York, the Attorney General has
decided to enforce hotel zoning laws and occupancy taxes on certain Airbnb
hosts.191 According to New York regulations, owners or tenants cannot
legally rent their apartments out for less than thirty days unless they are also
living in the property.192 In San Francisco, Airbnb announced that it would
collect and remit a 14% hotel occupancy fee.193 These steps prove that the
conceptual boundaries of home and hotel have become fuzzy. As the next
Part will show, the home is a revered and protected locus in American
law.194 The blurring of boundaries challenges the necessity and applicability
of the concept of “the home.”195
The second prototypical example is car sharing.196 Turo connects car
owners with possible renters who need a car but prefer not to own one.197
Some car-sharing sites offer specific campus or neighborhood sharing in
various countries.198 Indeed, private cars have limited usage per household
and it is estimated that cars spend about 90% of their time parked in parking
lots.199 Car sharing allows owners to maximize utility of the property. 200
This rationale is not restricted to cars.201 There are various underused items

190. See Yannopoulou et al., supra note 183, at 89.
191. Ilya Shapiro & Gabriel Latner, New York’s Pursuit of Airbnb Is an Attack on Privacy, DAILY
CALLER (Dec. 18, 2013, 10:43 AM), http://dailycaller.com/2013/12/18/new-yorks-pursuit-of-airbnbis-an-attack-on-privacy/.
192. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 4 (McKinney 2011).
193. Dara Kerr, Airbnb Begins Collecting 14% Hotel Tax in San Francisco, CNET (Sept. 17,
2014,
12:23
PM),
http://www.cnet.com/news/airbnb-begins-collecting-14-hotel-tax-in-sanfrancisco/.
194. See infra Part IV.
195. See infra Part IV.
196. See Eun Ji Cho & Liat Rogel, Urban Social Sustainability Through the Web: Using ICTS to
Build a Community for Prospective Neighbors, I.C.T.4.S. 167, 168 (2013).
197. How Turo Works, supra note 137.
198. See Cho & Rogel, supra note 196, at 168 (noting the existence of international car-sharing
sites, as well as a “campus-based service . . . operating at Stanford University, UC Berkeley, and
UCLA”).
199. Id. (identifying cars as an under-utilized product in the United States, where, as of 2011, cars
spent about “90[%] of the time sitting idle in parking lots”).
200. Id.
201. See id.
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in every household.202 NeighborGoods is a site that allows people that live
nearby to share their goods either for a fee or entirely for free.203 Certain
personal items—such as drills, ladders, lawnmowers, and bikes—are
individually owned but only rarely used.204 Indeed, as the site’s explanatory
video exclaims, “does everyone on your block need to own a
lawnmower?”205 Because many of the items are underutilized, the potential
economic benefits of such enterprises are considerable.206
These three sites facilitate the expanded utilization of items’ excess
capacity by creating peer-to-peer markets for private individuals. All of
these sites involve personal consumption property that is designed,
marketed, and purchased for private use and is traditionally shared only with
family and close friends.207 These sites have developed ways to expand the
personal consumption property’s use. The next Part will explain how this
purpose poses a threat to the concept of personal property.
IV. THE CHALLENGE
Inasmuch as the sharing economy movement will continue to gain
momentum and become a significant social phenomenon, it presents a
challenge to the legal concept of personal consumption property. Traditional
conceptualizations of typical personal possessions, such as the home, the car,
and household goods, are losing not only their centrality to the practice of
property law but also their legal coherence. Their long-established core has
become fragmented, exposed, and is now in need of a new legal framework.
This challenge stems from two main sources that correspond to the two
perspectives of sharing economy transactions: the owner’s perspective and

202. See NEIGHBORGOODS, supra note 17; cf. id. (suggesting that “[n]ot only physical assets, but
also intangible assets, such as time and skill, can be shared (or exchanged)” to increase efficiency).
203. Id.
204. See id.
205. NeighborGoods, How NeighborGoods Works, VIMEO (2010), https://vimeo.com/10659908.
206. See Benkler, supra note 134, at 308 (“[T]he owner [of a shared item] has an opportunity to
benefit if [the owner] can get any positive utility from allowing access to the excess capacity.”); see
also Anders Fremstad, Gains from Sharing: Sticky Norms, Endogenous Preferences, and the
Economics of Shareable Goods 2 (Univ. of Mass. Amherst Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No.
2014-02, 2014), http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1167&context=econ_
workingpaper (“There are ‘gains from sharing’ when the cost to the lender is less than the benefit to
the borrower.”).
207. See supra notes 177–204 and accompanying text.
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the user’s perspective.208 This Part begins with the former and then moves
on to the latter.
A. Conceptual Fragmentation
The concept of personal consumption property refers to possessions that
are deeply associated with self-development, personhood, and autonomy.209
The sharing economy splits the home, the car, or household possessions into
discrete units of use with different symbolic meanings. Alongside personal
use, these assets are exploited to produce profit, to interact with strangers,
and to allow widespread impersonal and disposable use.210 These seemingly
different functions undermine the coherence of the concept.
To illustrate this argument, think of the home. The home is an
important example because of its centrality in modern American culture as a
symbol of an intimate haven, where the individual and a family are secured
from the outside world.211 Although homeownership is fragmented in
economic terms into consumption and investment,212 and even though
American housing ethics include pluralist values,213 the internal workings of
the home remain, as a legal concept, personal and intimate.214 In other
words, the personal use of the home and intimate shared living space lie at
the core of the legal regulation of the home.215
The most striking portrait of the home as a secure shelter is found in
zoning laws.216 Zoning laws define the home as a sanctuary, physically

208. See infra Part IV.A–B.
209. See supra Part II.
210. See The Rise of the Sharing Economy, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-everything-hire-rise-sharing-economy.
211. See JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS
TRANSFORMING PRIVACY (2009) (describing the American cultural and legal perception of the home
as a secure, private, and individualized “castle”); Barros, supra note 81, at 259–60; Kreiczer-Levy,
supra note 89, at 139–40; Stern, supra note 103, at 1095–96.
212. See Fennell, supra note 122, at 1053–54.
213. Tim Iglesias, Our Pluralist Housing Ethics and the Struggle for Affordability, 42 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 511, 513–19 (2007) (identifying five distinct housing ethics in American law: “(1)
housing as an economic good, (2) housing as home, (3) housing as a human right, (4) housing as
social order, and (5) housing as one land use in a functional system”).
214. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001); Barros, supra note 81, at 255–56.
215. See Barros, supra note 81, at 259–61 (suggesting that “the unique nature of the home justifies
additional legal protection in some, but not all, circumstances”).
216. Cf. Garnett, supra note 19, at 1195–96 (noting the American conceptualization that “‘home’
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separated from the realities of commerce and urban life.217 The main
purpose of zoning codes is to organize land use of private lands by dividing
them into “zones.”218 As several scholars have noted, this division creates a
hierarchy of land uses.219 At the top of the pyramid are residential zones,
especially those reserved for the single family dwelling.220 Zoning laws
protect homes from incompatible uses and defend residential areas against
outside threats.221 In filtering incompatible uses, zoning ordinances achieve
two purposes: they preserve the home-business distinction and regulate
familial life.222
First, zoning codes in many municipalities specifically restrict homebased businesses.223 As Nicole Stelle Garnett explains, some municipalities
prohibit all home occupations in residential zones,224 others provide a list of
prohibited occupations,225 and still others distinguish between professionals
and nonprofessionals in granting permission to work from home.226 Second,
certain local zoning ordinances restrict use in residential neighborhoods to
narrowly defined single-family units.227 They regulate intimacy within the
home and push out nontraditional living arrangements such as
intergenerational families,228 college roommates,229 foster residence,230 and
and ‘work’ are incompatible”). See generally Joel Kosman, Toward an Inclusionary Jurisprudence:
A Reconceptualization of Zoning, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 59, 82 (1993) (describing the importance of
the American understanding of the home as private and secure).
217. Garnett, supra note 19, at 1201.
218. Id. at 1206.
219. See, e.g., Kosman, supra note 216, at 79 (noting that zoning laws prioritizes residential
“zones”).
220. Garnett, supra note 19, at 1201–02 (noting that zoning laws prioritized “physically set[ting]
apart [the home] from the realities of the urban work-a-day world”); see also Kosman, supra note
216, at 79 (describing the modern zoning practice of prioritizing protection of residential districts
which are “perceived as the cornerstone of American society of values”).
221. Garnett, supra note 19, at 1206.
222. See id. at 1195–96.
223. Id. at 1207.
224. See, e.g., MESA, ARIZ., ZONING ORDINANCES ch. 11, art. II, §§ 11-4-4, 11-5-5 (2014).
225. See, e.g., CORPUS CHRISTI, TEX., ZONING ORDINANCES art. I, § 3-1.36 (2010).
226. See, e.g., JEFFERSON PARISH, LA., COMPREHENSIVE ZONING ORDINANCE ch. 40, art. I, § 40-3
(2015); see also Garnett, supra note 19, at 1207–08.
227. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 495–96 (1934).
228. Id. at 498–99.
229. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 2–3 (1974); Borough of Glassboro v. Vallorosi,
568 A.2d 888, 889 (N.J. 1990).
230. City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 313 N.E.2d 756, 757 (N.Y. 1974).
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group homes.231 Although courts have struck some of these ordinances
down as violations of the freedom of association,232 the regulation of
residential units remains a prominent pillar of the home as a sanctuary. In
short, zoning laws exclude both commercial production and non-familial
living arrangements from the home.233 It thus serves to protect intimacy
from the market and from strangers.234
Privacy in the home is another legal field that solidifies the vision of
home as a castle.235 The four walls of the home define the boundaries of
“spiritual territoriality.”236 Case law has strongly maintained that a search in
the home cannot be conducted without a warrant.237 In a similar vein, in
Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a thermal imaging scan
of the home was an illegal search.238 These cases often assert that the
sanctity of the home and the right of the individual to retreat to his private
dwelling are key elements of American constitutional law.239 In addition,
case law emphasizes the intellectual and emotional needs that the privacy of
one’s home, as the private realm of family life, protects.240
This perception is actually fairly new,241 since for most of human history
the household was a center of productive activity and there was no clear

231. Berger v. New Jersey, 364 A.2d 993, 995 (N.J. 1976).
232. See, e.g., Moore, 431 U.S. at 498–99 (“On its face [the regulation] selects certain categories
of relatives who may live together and declares that others may not.”).
233. See supra notes 220–30 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 220–31 and accompanying text.
235. See SUK, supra note 211, at 2; see also Barros, supra note 81, at 259–60; Robert M. Rakoff,
Ideology in Everyday Life: The Meaning of the House, 7 POL. & SOC’Y 85, 85 (1977); Smith, supra
note 91, at 32; Stern, supra note 103, at 1100.
236. John Messerly, Comment, Roommate Wanted: The Right to Choice in Shared Living, 93
IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1964 (2008).
237. Barros, supra note 81, at 267–68.
238. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35–36 (2001) (holding that “thermal-imaging
observations of the intimate details of a home are impermissible”).
239. Id. at 31–37 (emphasizing the importance of protecting the intimate details of the home);
accord Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583–85
(1980); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976); Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
240. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); see also Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S 557, 565 (1969) (affirming the right of an individual to “satisfy his intellectual and
emotional needs in the privacy of his own home); Brooke Wright, Comment, Fair Housing and
Roommates: Contesting a Presumption of Constitutionality, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1341, 1356–57
(identifying the right to privacy, especially within the home, as a “fundamental liberty”).
241. Garnett, supra note 19, at 1199.
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distinction between the home and the community.242 The transition from a
preindustrial society to a modern economic society brought with it a clear
theoretical division between the domestic sphere and the market sphere.243
The home has been reconstructed to mean a shelter from the cold outside
world, the tensions of commerce, and the backstabbing nature of
competition.244 Defined as a shelter, the home is understood to be
commerce-free and antithetical to the idea of production.245 Feminist
scholars have criticized this vision, dubbed the separate spheres ideology,
because it subjects and restricts women to the roles of homemaker and
caretaker.246 Despite the prominence of such accounts, this division is still
influential in the legal conceptualization of the home as intimate and secure
for numerous reasons.247
Now consider the sharing economy.248 Airbnb poses a threat to the
vision of the home as a pure, private, and revered sanctuary. It invites
commercial transactions and strangers into the home.249 True, home
business poses a threat to the commerce-free environment as well, as Garnett
eloquently argues.250 Yet the sharing economy poses a bigger, more
fundamental threat than working from home. Airbnb is not only a type of
242. Id.; Janet Halley, What Is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part I, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 2–3
(2010); Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law: Genealogies
and Contemporary Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 753, 756–57 (2010)
(describing the history of the American household as “an explicitly economic unit housing both
human reproduction and material production); Duncan Kennedy, Savigny’s Family/Patrimony
Distinction and Its Place in the Global Genealogy of Classical Legal Thought, 58 AM. J. COMP. L.
811, 832 (2010).
243. Garnett, supra note 19, at 1201–02.
244. Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1499 (1983).
245. Id. (“The . . . home [was] seen as [a] safe repositor[y] for the virtues and emotions people
believed were being banished from the world of commerce and industry.”). But see Jan De Vries,
The Industrial Revolution and the Industrious Revolution, 54 J. ECON. HIST. 249, 255–57 (1994)
(describing the household as a “unit of . . . production and labor power”).
246. Olsen, supra note 244, at 1510–12.
247. See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles & Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Family Formation and the Home, 104
KY. L.J. (forthcoming 2016) (providing a progressive vision of the home and focus on stability,
intimacy, and interdependence in cohabitation); Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106
MICH. L. REV. 189, 191 (2007) (providing feminist account and critique); see also Stern, supra note
103, at 1109 (“The personhood theory of the home maintains that an individual constitutes herself as
a person through a secure and ongoing relationship with certain property.”).
248. See Sacks, supra note 133.
249. See Geron, supra note 13.
250. Garnett, supra note 19, at 1209–17.
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business; it is also a different mode of sharing one’s residence.251 It brings
people into one’s home, not as visiting customers, but as temporal, casual
roomers.252 According to Viviana Zelizer, living with others creates a
certain type of intimacy.253 She defines intimacy as knowledge of and
attention to details that would, were they to become public, create
embarrassment or damage the individual’s social esteem.254 Living with
strangers mixes the distant with the intimate. However, unlike renting a
room to a permanent tenant, the sharing economy opens up the possibility
for short-term, casual renting patterns. The home becomes a platform for
interactions and social exchange with strangers that come and go.255 The
home, household goods, or the car turn into an open environment that is less
intimate, private, and secure.
To rephrase the argument in Radin’s terms, personhood property—be it
the home or the car—distinctively contributes to self-development because
it is a repository of personal thoughts, history, and memories of
relationships.256 The sharing economy complicates this concept because it
involves production, decentralization, and widespread use.257 A possible
rebuttal is that when owners share their property with strangers as part of the
sharing economy, their property is not personhood property in the Radian
sense. This rebuttal helps keep the property category neat and clear, but it
ignores the potential of individuals to shape their own private environment
and invite in various types of interactions. Moreover, it may only be true as
long as the sharing economy phenomenon is sporadic and uncommon.
Inasmuch as the phenomenon will continue to gain momentum, it is bound
to alter the way we think about this type of property.
A more salient configuration of the same argument is that the sharing
economy phenomenon obscures the concept of home by blurring the line

251. How It Works, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/getting-started/how-it-works (last
visted Dec. 16, 2015).
252. Garnett, supra note 19, at 1209–17.
253. VIVIANA ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY 213–14 (2007) (arguing that living in a
household almost always engages household members in intimacy because cohabitants have
information and attention that if made public could damage the reputation and welfare of other
cohabitants).
254. Id. at 14–15.
255. See Geron, supra note 13.
256. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
257. See BUCZYNSKI, supra note 7, at 2; supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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between a home and a hotel. A hotel is “an establishment that provides
lodging and usually meals, entertainment, and various personal services for
the public.”258 As part of the hospitality business, a hotel is open to the
public259 and is characterized by hospitable, yet impersonal, interaction.260
This dichotomy is a fairly new one, since historically the inn evolved from
the private house.261 It was common for householders to receive a stranger
as a guest for the night.262 Yet, under the current legal regime, the categories
of hotel and home are perceived as antithetical.263 They rule each other out,
with the home receiving superior legal protection.264 Similar, though less
forceful, antithetical categories can be applied to cars265 and household
possessions.266
The sharing economy challenges this type of antithetical reasoning.267
This social phenomenon unsettles a set of predetermined dichotomies.268
The hierarchy of home and hotel relies on the public-private dichotomy.269
The home is a private arena, shielded from prying eyes, while the hotel is

258. See Hotel, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hotel (last
visited Nov. 5, 2015). The legal definition of zoning law equally emphasizes the presence of
lodging and food on the premises and the accommodation of strangers and travelers. See, e.g.,
MARK BOBROWSKI, HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETTS LAND USE AND PLANNING LAW § 12.12[O]
(2d ed. 2002). It is kept public and open to the public. See JOHN E. H. SHERRY, THE LAWS OF
INNKEEPERS: FOR HOTELS, MOTELS, RESTAURANTS, AND CLUBS 9 (3d ed. 1993).
259. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012); MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 258.
260. Cf. SHERRY, supra note 258, at 9 (explaining that inns developed from private houses).
261. Id. at 6.
262. Id.
263. See supra notes 226–40 and accompanying text.
264. Although the police cannot search an occupied hotel room without a warrant, hotel workers
can enter the room to provide services and, in certain cases, if the guest is disturbing other guests
(occasionally upon calling the police). See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); United States
v. Jeffers 342 U.S. 48 (1951), overruled on other grounds by Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978);
SHERRY, supra note 258, at 198–99.
265. There are distinct differences between a private car and rental cars or taxis. Natasha Meyers,
Note and Comment, ELRAC, Inc. v. Masara: Is the New York Court of Appeals Undermining the
Concept of Permissive Use Under the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law?, 18 TOURO L. REV. 409,
413 (2002) (noting that “car rental agencies are not in the same position as private car owners”).
266. Personal possessions can be contrasted with pawnshops. Pawnshops don’t rent items, but
maintain possession of items as security for a loan. I use the example in order to draw a line
between a distant commercial use and personal private use.
267. See Balkin, supra note 21, at 744–46.
268. See, e.g., Messerly, supra note 236, at 1963.
269. Id.
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open to the public.270 If privacy is about keeping information concealed, and
intimacy is about attention to and knowledge of sensitive details,271 then the
home is certainly more private than a hotel. However, if owners open up
their home to strangers, then the home’s privacy is compromised and it is in
fact open to the public in a manner similar to a small hotel.272
Yet privacy can also mean the ability to choose “one’s social relations
free from social constraints.”273 In fact, historically the word was associated
with familiarity with others away from the discipline of family and the
formality of public officials.274 The understanding of privacy as a choice is
very much connected to the idea of private property.275 Leading theorists of
property theory highlight the owner’s prerogative to exclude others from the
owner’s property as the core of ownership and property law.276 This right to
exclude can be restated to mean that the owner can choose to include people,
share property, and allow others to participate in the process of shaping its
contours.277 Despite important critiques of the exclusion approach278 that
dispute its premise both descriptively279 and normatively,280 it demonstrates
270. See id. (explaining the public-private distinction in the context of the home).
271. See ZELIZER, supra note 253, at 14–15.
272. See supra notes 270–71 and accompanying text.
273. Austin, supra note 82, at 452.
274. Id. (quoting Roger Chartier, Introduction: Community, State, and Family: Trajectories and
Tensions, in A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE: PASSIONS OF THE RENAISSANCE 400 (Roger Chartier ed.,
Arthur Goldhammer trans., 1989)).
275. See Sherry F. Colb, A World Without Privacy: Why Property Does Not Define the Limits of
the Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 102 MICH. L. REV. 889, 890 (2003)
(discussing the Fourth Amendment as a protection of property).
276. See J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 103 (1997); Larissa Katz, Exclusion and
Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275 (2008); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849, 1857, 1891 (2007); Ernest J.
Weinrib, Poverty and Property in Kant’s System of Rights, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 795, 808
(2003).
277. Daniel B. Kelly, The Right to Include, 63 EMORY L.J. 857, 859 (2014); see also Katz, supra
note 276, at 278 (defining the owner as the “supreme agenda setter for the resource”).
278. See HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 37–55 (2011) (providing a
critique of the centrality of exclusion in property law); see also Gregory S. Alexander, The SocialObligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009); Gregory S.
Alexander, Eduardo M. Peñalver, Joseph William Singer & Laura S. Underkuffler, A Statement of
Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2009); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property as
Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889 (2005); Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estate: Property Law in
a Free and Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009 (2009).
279. See DAGAN, supra note 278, at 35–37; Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U.
PA. L. REV. 1853, 1855 (2012).
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the intricacy of the concept of privacy in the realm of property.281 If privacy
is about control, an Airbnb host achieves privacy by managing her social
relations. The property becomes a platform for social exchange and social
interaction. When an owner decides to continuously share the asset for
whatever purpose—economic or social—she opens it up as a site for
interaction and communal activity. She moves further away, however, from
the vision of the home as a secluded shelter.
Additionally, the hierarchy is also based on the distinction between
personal and impersonal, business and intimacy. The assumption is that the
hotel is a commercial enterprise whereas the home is personal, intimate, and
a locus of familial relations.282 This dichotomy is also based on the
distinction between the sphere of domestic bliss and the sphere of
commercial market transactions.283 This approach strictly separates the
intimate from the commercial as two incompatible “hostile worlds.”284 The
sharing economy, however, allows homes to have multiple symbolic roles.
Thus, the home becomes a site for commercial transactions concerning
shared living arrangements.285 These shared residences are short-term,
casual, and do not provide opportunity for personal connection. The home
becomes at the same time commercial and intimate, personal and
impersonal, private and public, moving away from a clear and coherent
conception.286
It is tempting to think of the sharing economy as a retreat to collectivism
or an anti-consumerism movement.287 As I explain in the next Part, this is
not an accurate description of the phenomenon, and the reality is more
complex.288 The true challenge to property theory in the modern economy
lies in rediscovering the socioeconomic potential of private assets, which,
despite having historical roots, has been transparent in previous decades.
280. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
281. See DAGAN, supra note 278, at 38.
282. See Messerly, supra note 236, at 1966–67.
283. Olsen, supra note 244, at 1497–98.
284. Cf. ZELIZER, supra note 253, at 22–23 (arguing that the “feared contamination [between the
separate spheres] runs in both directions”); Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Mothering for Money: Regulating
Commercial Intimacy, 88 IND. L.J. 1223, 1240 (2013).
285. Cf. De Vries, supra note 245, 255–57 (comparing the historical analysis of the industrious
revolution and the role of household production).
286. See Messerly, supra note 236, at 1958–61.
287. See infra notes 405–12 and accompanying text.
288. See infra Part IV.B.
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This multifaceted structure depletes the concept of personal
consumption property of its compelling socio-legal symbolic power. This
can result in two opposite conceptual outcomes. One is that the concept of
property becomes devoid of meaning. The other is that the concept of
personal consumption property deserves a richer, more complex
understanding.
B. Access or Ownership
The sharing economy is not just about the owners of homes, cars, and
other valued possessions who are looking for new ways to make use of their
property. It is equally about users: consumers who choose not to purchase
property, but rather to bargain for short-term use.289 They pay per use of a
car, bike, or drill only when they need to use it.290 This consumer trend
poses a fundamental challenge to the personal consumption property
argument.291 Indeed, a number of scholars have criticized Radin’s argument,
questioning the essentialism and political background of the connection
between property and personhood and highlighting its subjective nature.292
Stephanie Stern argues that there is little evidence from psychological
research to support the argument that the home constructs identity.293
Rather, the home expresses and maintains identity at best.294 What
contributes to human flourishing, according to her argument, are not mere
possessions, but rather social interactions.295 Stephen Schnably has further
claimed that “[t]he ideal of the home is not one simply constructed by
individuals, but is one that has been actively fostered by the state and other
ʻprivate’ actors wielding significant social power.”296
A different critique of the personhood theory is that attachment to
material possessions draws, at least partly, on comparisons to others.297

289. See Sacks, supra note 133.
290. Id.
291. See infra note 292 and accompanying text.
292. See Fox, supra note 91, at 581–86 (responding to the argument that attachment to the home is
subjective).
293. Stern, supra note 103, at 1110.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin’s Theory of Property
and Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REV. 347, 373–74 (1993).
297. Davidson, supra note 58, at 759–60.
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Property signals relative status because material possessions mark and
reinforce economic, social, and cultural hierarchies.298 This potential
interrelation between personhood and possessions may fuel competitive
consumption.299 Indeed, ecological and anti-consumerism motivations steer
individuals away from ownership as a source of personal meaning.300
The sharing economy seems to fit perfectly with this movement.301
Facilitated by online communication, the sharing economy is driven by the
power of social media to utilize excess capacity of property.302 For users,
social networks facilitate efficient short-term use by significantly lowering
transaction costs.303 Instead of ownership, consumers find other means for
achieving and projecting personal identity.304 As Rachel Botsman and Roo
Rogers argue in their popular book about collaborative consumption, online
social networks provide new ways of self-expression.305 People share what
they are doing (Twitter), what they are reading (Shelfari), and who their
friends are (Facebook).306 They further explain: “[A]s our online ‘brands’
define ‘who we are’ and ‘what we like,’ actual ownership becomes less
important than demonstrating use or use by association. We can now show
status, group affiliation, and belonging without necessarily having to buy
physical objects.”307
The outcome of this consumer trend results, for several reasons, in a
gradual tendency towards access to property in preference to ownership of

298. Id. at 760–61.
299. Id. at 799–800.
300. Stephen Zavestoski, Environmental Concern and Anti-Consumerism in the Self-Concept: Do
They Share the Same Basis?, in EXPLORING SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION: ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 173, 175–76 (Maurie J. Cohen & Joseph Murphy eds., 2001).
See generally KIM HUMPHREY, EXCESS: ANTI-CONSUMERISM IN THE WEST (2013) (detailing anticonsumerism with the western nations).
301. Lamberton & Rose, supra note 143, at 109.
302. Benkler, supra note 134, at 338.
303. GABRIEL H. MUGAR, A PRACTICE PERSPECTIVE ON WEBSITES FOR THE SHARING ECONOMY
738, 738–41 (2012) (describing the role of websites in the sharing economy).
304. See Lauren I. Labrecque, Jonas vor dem Esche, Charla Mathwick, Thomas P. Novak &
Charles F. Hofacker, Consumer Power: Evolution in the Digital Age, 27 J. INTERACTIVE MKT. 257,
266 (2013) (describing the effect of technology and the sharing economy on the balance of power
between consumers and firms).
305. BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 8, at 98.
306. Id.
307. Id.
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property.308 Jeremy Rifkin made this projection almost fifteen years ago in
his influential book The Age of Access.309 According to his argument,
ownership of market goods becomes outdated in the hyper-capitalist
economy.310 Exchange of ownership is too slow of a mechanism to adapt to
fast technological advances, information flows, and human creativity.311 In
the new economy, “markets are making ways for networks and ownership is
steadily being replaced by access.”312 Instead of buyers and sellers, servers
and clients bargain for short-term access through leases, rentals,
subscriptions, or memberships.313 Take, for example, cars. When a dealer
sells a car to a buyer, their relationship is limited and short-term.314 If the
client gains access to the car in the form of a lease, however, the relationship
is ongoing, renewable, and potentially perpetual.315 These become what
Rifkin terms “commodifying relationships.”316 Consequently, “[w]hen
everyone is embedded in commercial networks of one sort or another and in
continuous association by way of paid leases, partnerships, subscriptions and
retainer fees, all time is commercial time.”317 This description, along with
other insights, contributes to Rifkin’s conclusion that the network economy
leads to the commodification of time and experiences.318
Although it is tempting to treat the sharing economy as part of the
network economy portrayed by Rifkin, the challenge the sharing economy
presents is quite different. First of all, the type of sharing economy
transactions analyzed in this Article deals with private assets owned and
purchased for the purpose of private consumption. It is a socioeconomic
phenomenon whose uniqueness lies in that it concerns not only businesses
but also individuals seeking either to lower costs of consumption or make

308. JEREMY RIFKIN, THE AGE OF ACCESS: THE NEW CULTURE OF HYPERCAPITALISM, WHERE
ALL OF LIFE IS A PAID-FOR EXPERIENCE 4 (2000).
309. Id.
310. Id. at 5–6.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 4.
313. Id. at 6.
314. See, e.g., 10 Steps for Selling Your Car, KELLEY BLUE BOOK, http://www.kbb.com/sell-yourcar/completing-the-sale-of-your-car/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2015).
315. RIFKIN, supra note 308, at 10.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
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use of excess capacity.319 Second, Rifkin focused on changing patterns of
capitalist consumption as the driving force of the network economy rather
than the sharing among individuals at the center of the sharing economy.320
However, this is an important characteristic that makes the phenomenon
unique and challenging. The sharing economy cannot be reduced to either
Rifkin’s vision of hyper-capitalism or a utopian vision of sharing. On the
one hand, the sharing economy involves social and commercial networks,
fast flows of information, and a strong focus on access.321 On the other
hand, the sharing of property among individuals results in decreased levels
of consumption322 and increased efficiency in the use of property.323 In this
sense, it drifts away from prophecies of over-consumption into the realm of
sustainability.
Indeed, users’ preferences to share rather than own can be driven by
economic, social, or ecological motivations324 and present a competing view
of the relations between objects and people. The sharing economy is thus
entangled with the ideologies and politics of consumption, capitalism, and
markets.325 My argument, however, is not that ownership is obsolete. Even
in the era of modern consumption, people still value attachments to personal
possessions.326 The argument is that the sharing economy should direct our
attention to multiple uses, functions, and values that are at stake here, not
only autonomy and self-development.327
V. REINVENTION OF THE CATEGORY
The inherent difficulties within the concept of personal consumption
property, now intensified by the sharing economy, can lead to the conclusion
that the concept is obsolete. Personal consumption property does not make
any sense under current legal reality, if it ever did. I would suggest not
319. See supra notes 301–04 and accompanying text.
320. RIFKIN, supra note 308, at 143–44.
321. See supra notes 301–04 and accompanying text.
322. See generally Boyd Cohen & Jan Kietzmann, Ride On! Mobility Business Models for the
Sharing Economy, 27 ORG. & ENV’T 279, 280 (2014) (describing the new popularity of sharing
economy).
323. See generally Benkler, supra note 134, at 279.
324. See supra notes 301–02, 322 and accompanying text.
325. Michel Bauwens, Class and Capital in Peer Production, 33 CAP. & CLASS 121, 125 (2009).
326. See supra note 91.
327. See infra Part V.
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rushing to this type of conclusion. Although it may be too strict, at its core
the distinction has some explanatory and justificatory force. Distinguishing
among different assets based on their contribution to autonomy, dignity, or
freedom is what typifies a rich and nuanced legal system.328 Assets have
different economic functions and symbolic meanings.329 However, the
notion of personal consumption property captures only a fragment of the
fuller, more complex picture. As the sharing economy phenomenon reveals,
consumption property can encompass a range of uses and legal relations.330
Therefore, the concept of an interactive personal space is more attuned to the
variety of networks that affect the home and other personal possessions. The
personal use of property serves as a potential platform for additional
interaction. Like many challenges, the sharing economy provides an
opportunity to redefine personal space by opening up new possibilities of
communal and commercial interactions.331 This Part will explore these
possibilities, and map the structural relations engendered by the sharing
economy in an interactive personal space. Four focal points of the
transaction run through this analysis: (1) the owner; (2) the user; (3) the
social and economic role of the asset; and (4) the community.
To understand the role of the sharing economy in structuring
relationships, it is useful to think of Zelizer’s theory of connected lives.332
The distinction between the intimate and commercial, market and home, or
personal and impersonal location, relies on the “hostile world” or “separate
sphere” approach.333 This approach marks “distinct arenas for economic
activity and intimate relations.”334 Against this approach, Zelizer points out
that many transactions involve a mixture of economic and intimate
characteristics.335 Furthermore, the structure of economic transaction and
the intimacy of social relations are, in some sense, interdependent.336

328. On the importance of context-based analysis in property law, see infra note 425 and
accompanying text.
329. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 58, at 761 (“[P]roperty serves as an important locus for
symbolic meaning.”).
330. See, e.g., Lamberton & Rose, supra note 143, at 109–10.
331. See ZELIZER, supra note 253, at 3.
332. ZELIZER, supra note 253, at 2 (“[P]eople lead connected lives, and that plenty of economic
activity goes into creating, defining, and sustaining social ties.”).
333. Id.
334. Id. at 20–21.
335. Id. at 11.
336. Id. at 20–21.
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According to Zelizer, as certain transactions become common, they
transform the meaning and type of relationship by challenging former
categories.337 Consequently, people begin to renegotiate previous social
boundaries and distinctions.338 Zelizer cites childcare as an example:
commercial adoption agencies, commercial childcare, and the system of
public foster care have changed the definition of parenthood.339 This results
in new distinctions among the birth child, adopted child, client’s child, foster
child, and so on.340 Similarly, as the sharing economy becomes prevalent, it
will ultimately change definitions of personal consumption property and
offer new distinctions within the concept of home, hotel, car, household
goods, and more. When people choose a type of transaction, they will
actually be choosing a type of relationship with their paying guests,
neighbors, and community.341
The sharing economy both structures new legal relationships and
reshapes the meaning and function of the asset.342 A transaction’s rules,
customs, and forms shape not only social relations but also the property’s
nature, function, and value.343 This influences the asset’s market value,
symbolic meaning, and physical traits. Consider the complex system of
property relationships that the previously discussed websites have
developed. The sharing economy is made possible because of vast
technological improvements that have facilitated communication between
owners and sharers.344 Most of these transactions are made via the Internet,
through websites that also include reputation mechanisms.345 The user

337. Id. at 38.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 37.
342. As property scholars have emphasized, property cannot be adequately understood and
theorized without considering the ways people share property and cooperate in property-related
projects. See Nedelsky, supra note 87, at 184; Carol M. Rose, Property as Story Telling:
Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37,
48–53 (1990); Singer, supra note 87, at 619, 621.
343. Property analysis has to be mindful of governance structures, or the internal workings of
property interactions. See Alexander, supra note 279, 1863–65.
344. Benkler, supra note 134, at 278.
345. See, e.g., How Do Reviews Work?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/13 (last
visited Nov. 5, 2015) (explaining the details of the review system); NeighborGoods FAQ,
NEIGHBORGOODS, http://neighborgoods.net/faq (last visited Nov. 5, 2015).

97

[Vol. 43: 61, 2015]

Consumption Property in the Sharing Economy
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

writes a review on the sharing experience, the property, and the owner.346 In
some cases, the property owner also writes a review of the sharer’s use.347
Reputation works as a safeguard for prospective users, and it also raises the
value of the property.348 A host on Airbnb can charge a higher price when
her reviews are impeccable.349 Sharers participate in shaping the value and
function of the asset by influencing the price, marketability, and even
physical attributes.350 Indeed, owners are occasionally willing to add
furniture, change facilities, or even own new pets to secure a positive
review.351 Market forces and social norms thus create a voice-inducing
participation mechanism that improves the market value and usability of
assets. Instead of repeat players or formal right-holders, an entire network
of users, owners, and future users participate in the sharing economy and the
sites that host it.352
Moreover, collaborative consumption builds new forms of commercial
relations. Instead of a consumer and a seller (often a commercial company)
there is an owner and a user. Unlike commercial companies that rent out
cars, for example, the owners in our cases are invested in the property
because they are still the primary users. The owner and the user actually
share the consumption of the same property and the user participates in the
utilization of the property.353 This makes property somewhat more personal,
connected, and—as the name would suggest—collaborative.
One must also consider the role of consumption property in the
neighborhood or larger community. The vision of the home as a detached

346. See How Do Reviews Work?, supra note 345.
347. See generally Help Center, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/241/i-m-a-guest-what-are-some-safety-tips-i-can-follow?topic=245 (last visited Nov. 5, 2015).
348. Id. (“I’m a guest. What are some safety tips I can follow? 1. Look at the profiles and
reviews of potential hosts.”).
349. See, e.g., Your Airbnb Pricing Strategy Sucks, LEARNAIRBNB, http://www.learnairbnb.com/
airbnb-pricing-strategy-sucks/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2015) (“When you first list your unit, especially if
it’s your first unit, you have little credibility with the community . . . . You need your Airbnb
pricing well below market price . . . . But after you build up your reviews, you’ll need to raise your
prices accordingly.”).
350. See Rachel Botsman, The Currency of the New Economy Is Trust, TEDGLOBAL (Sept. 24,
2012), http://www.ted.com/talks/rachel_botsman_the_currency_of_the_new_economy_is_trust
(discussing a case where the owner decided to get a cat to avoid a negative review concerning mice
on the premises).
351. Id.
352. See supra notes 342–49 and accompanying text.
353. See supra note 344 and accompanying text.
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private territory, isolated from outside threats, is mostly an illusion.354 The
home is influenced by the community surrounding it.355 It is affected by
what happens outside its four walls.356 The home’s market and personal
values are affected by schools, highways, land use, and, most of all, the
neighborhood ambiance and composition of the community.357 This delicate
interplay between the home and the community is layered into the
conceptual structure of the home in law, yet the vision of this relationship is
limited.358
The law accommodates certain communal environments. I refer mostly
to residential communities, particularly common interest communities
(CICs) that include homeowner associations, condominiums, and
cooperatives.359 CICs rely on private rules to enforce a number of
covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) that secure a protected
environment.360 These restrictions deal with the aesthetic of landscape—the
exterior of housing units, outside storage, or display of unused cars—or
activities that affect the neighborhood.361 Although they are aimed at
preserving the market value of dwellings and a safe neighborhood,362 these
restrictions have broader implications. In the name of security, privacy, and
the social fabric, CICs create restrictions that protect the community to the
354. Nadav Shoked, The Community Aspect of Private Ownership, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 759,
771 (2011).
355. LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND PROPERTY
LINES 1–5 (2009); see also Shoked, supra note 354, at 771 (suggesting that “the individual and the
private abode are meaningless when separated from their surrounding community”).
356. Shoked, supra note 354, at 762.
357. See FENNELL, supra note 355, at 1–3; Shoked, supra note 354, at 762.
358. See Shoked, supra note 354, at 761 (“But the state appellate court was undeterred by the
unconventionality of the legal challenge, and it reversed the decision. It explained that ‘even if [Ms.
Rodriguez’s] property might experience net dollar value increases, theoretically realizable in the
future,’ she would suffer harms, ‘including destruction of . . . neighborhood social and commercial
fabric.’ Accordingly the court concluded that she had stated a constitutional claim.” (citing
Rodriguez v. Henderson, 578 N.E.2d 57, 59 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991))).
359. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 101, at 896; see also, e.g., Uniform Common Interest
Ownership Act, W. VA. CODE §§ 36B-1-101 to 207 (2015).
360. See Amnon Lehavi, Community and Property: How Property Can Create, Maintain, or
Destroy Community, 10 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 43, 57–58 (2009); David J. Kennedy, Note,
Residential Associations as State Actors: Regulating the Impact of Gated Communities on
Nonmembers, 105 YALE L.J. 761, 762 (1995); Ross Thomas, Note, Ungating Suburbia: Property
Rights, Political Participation, and Common Interest Communities, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
205, 206–07 (2012).
361. Amnon Lehavi, Mixing Property, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 137, 163–66 (2008).
362. FENNELL, supra note 355, at 75–80; Kennedy, supra note 360, at 765–66.
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exclusion of others.363 As they maintain the character of community and real
estate values, residential communities are becoming more homogenous,
segregated, and privatized.364 Indeed, homogenous communities appear to
be appealing to homebuyers.365 Moreover, governmental failures have led
communities to own and operate playgrounds, swimming pools, parks,
tennis courts, and community centers.366 Streets in neighborhoods are
becoming private and the public space is getting smaller.367
This new urban planning has drawn criticism. Legal scholars are
concerned about exclusion, segregation based on class and race, and the lack
of pluralism.368 These legal claims fit within a larger movement of social
critics that protest against the destruction of the public sphere.369 According
to this claim, commercial and private spaces, such as shopping malls, gated
communities, and other commercial venues, are replacing areas of face-toface interaction with people of different ages, appearances, and classes.370
The loss of open public space creates a spatial environment characterized by
impersonality, alienation, and commodification.371 A competing vision
supported by these critics refers to an “ideal of community as pure
copresence of subjects”372 or “a collective of strangers sharing equal
regard.”373
363. Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential Associations and
Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 12–16 (1989); Kennedy, supra note 360, at 765–66; Thomas,
supra note 360, at 206–08.
364. Kennedy, supra note 360, at 766.
365. Id.
366. Thomas, supra note 360, at 211.
367. Kennedy, supra note 360, at 769–71.
368. Alexander, supra note 363, at 1–3; Kennedy, supra note 360, at 769–71; Thomas, supra note
360, at 211; see Alexander Kedar, On the Legal Geography of Ethnocratic Settler States: Notes
Towards a Research Agenda, 5 CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 401, 411–13 (2003); see also ISSACHAR
ROSEN-ZVI, TAKING SPACE SERIOUSLY: LAW, SPACE AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY ISRAEL
(2004) (discussing the nature of space and spatial exclusion through an examination of Israel).
369. See, e.g., MIKE DAVIS, THE CITY OF QUARTZ: EXCAVATING THE FUTURE IN LOS ANGELES 3
(1992); MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS AND THE ETHICS OF
QUEER LIFE 149–52 (1999); IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 226–
256 (1990); Davina Cooper, Regard Between Strangers: Diversity, Equality and the Reconstruction
of Public Space, 18 CRITICAL SOC. POL’Y 465, 465–66 (1998).
370. DAVIS, supra note 369, at 3; YOUNG, supra note 369, at 232, 240; see Cooper, supra note
369, at 472–74.
371. YOUNG, supra note 369, at 232.
372. Id.
373. Cooper, supra note 369, at 474.
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More concretely, according to the social doctrine termed “new
urbanism,” the built environment can create a sense of community.374 The
design and planning principles of new urbanism include walkability,
connectivity, increased density, green transportation, and mixed use.375
These principles are thought to encourage community life. Walkability, for
instance, is about designing streets as public space, rather than mere voids
between buildings, which contributes to street life, pedestrian activity, and a
sense of place.376 Another important principle is mixed use. Places of
residence should be juxtaposed with places of business, shopping, and
recreation. This encourages integration of people of different ages, races,
and income levels because people walk more, drive less, and have a better
chance of meeting.377
The mixture of residential and commercial land uses creates a
multipurpose space where lingering is encouraged, which creates a setting
for “repetitive chance encounters” that, in turn, builds and strengthens
community bonds.378
Although the sharing economy is not about city planning, there is a
useful analogy here. The sharing economy creates a spatial environment
that stands between CICs’ private or semiprivate space and the public space
advocated by the social critics.379 The sharing economy can be viewed as
supporting an intermediate physical space between purely private and public
spaces.380 Indeed, collaborative consumption could be a driving force that
solidifies community ties.381 NeighborGoods and car sharing sites all
encourage swapping, lending, and renting possessions to others who live
nearby.382 They bring neighbors together and contribute to the unique social
374. See Vincent Scully, The Architecture of Community, in THE NEW URBANISM: AN
ARCHITECTURE OF COMMUNITY 221 (Peter Katz ed., 1994).
375. See Principles of Urbanism, NEW URBANISM, http://www.newurbanism.org/newurbanism/
principles.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2015); see also The Charter of the New Urbanism, CONGRESS
FOR NEW URBANISM, https://www.cnu.org/who-we-are/charter-new-urbanism (last visited Nov. 5,
2015).
376. Emily Talen, Sense of Community and Neighborhood Form: An Assessment of the Social
Doctrine of New Urbanism, 36 URB. STUD. 1361, 1364 (1999).
377. Id.; see also Hollie Lund, Testing the Claims of New Urbanism: Local Access, Pedestrian
Travel, and Neighboring Behaviors, 69 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 414, 427–28 (2003).
378. See Lund, supra note 377, at 427–28.
379. See supra notes 359–64, 368–373 and accompanying text.
380. See Lund, supra note 377, at 428.
381. Id.
382. Cho & Rogel, supra note 196, at 169.
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fabric.383 The role of peer-to-peer markets in bolstering social interaction
fits nicely with the call for reinventing the public space.384 Without
changing the planned environment, the sharing economy expands the use of
residential neighborhoods to include aspects of both a commercial and
personal nature.385 In addition, peer-to-peer sharing sites encourage social
interaction that includes personal exchanges of goods and money in a way
that potentially crosses ages, races, and income levels.386 The sharing
economy also promotes integration because it allows lower-income owners
to earn money and afford housing.387
As the sharing economy phenomenon gains force, it is hard to dispute
that it is connecting people of various ages and statuses.388 It not only
connects them virtually (similar to the Internet)389 but also facilitates face-toface communication with neighbors, the community, and beyond.390 It
promotes commerce among individuals who often meet in person and
become enmeshed in each other’s social environment.391 Like the traditional
marketplace, it is a location that hosts communal interactions.392 It thus
certainly restructures relations among neighbors and the community at
large.393 Strangers become familiar, and friends may engage in commercial
383. Id.
384. See generally Yan Song & Gerrit-Jan Knaap, New Urbanism and Housing Values: A
Disaggregate Assessment, 54 J. URB. ECON. 218 (2003) (describing the benefits of new urbanism).
385. Cho & Rogel, supra note 196, at 168–69.
386. But see Edelman & Luca, supra note 14 (finding discrimination against black hosts in Airbnb
transactions).
387. On the other hand, short-term rentals by owners that do not live in the house they rent out can
lead to a shortage in long-term housing. See generally Arvind Malhotra & Marshall Van Alstyne,
The Dark Side of The Sharing Economy . . . and How to Lighten It, 57 COMM. A.C.M. 24 (2014).
388. Id.
389. See Celene A. Navarrete & Esperanza Huerta, Building Virtual Bridges to Home: The Use of
the Internet by Transnational Communities of Immigrants, 11 INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 7, 7
(2006); Nicholas Suzor, Order Supported by Law: The Enforcement of Rules in Online
Communities, 63 MERCER L. REV. 523, 523–24 (2012) (discussing the growing importance of online
communities).
390. See supra note 377 and accompanying text.
391. Cf. YOUNG, supra note 369, at 232.
392. SOPHIE WATSON & DAVID STUDDERT, MARKETS AS SITES FOR SOCIAL INTERACTION vii
(2006) (“The findings indicated that markets are indeed important sites of social interaction for local
communities. Although the markets in the study varied considerably in the level of social
interaction, the strength of social ties, the level of social inclusion and the use of the market by
different groups, in all the markets some degree of social interaction took place and in most cases
respondents confirmed the significance of the market as a social space.”)
393. See Cho & Rogel, supra note 196, at 169.
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transactions.394
Yet, alongside this regeneration of the public space, the sharing
economy is not a truly open environment.395 First, local government and
private regulations may restrict the market for short-term tourist rentals.396
Frequent short-term rentals may influence the noise, cleanliness, and density
of population, and a constant flow of strangers that come and go may affect
the atmosphere of the neighborhood,397 leading to new restrictions and
regulations. Second, sharing sites could de facto enhance solidarity within a
given community but not with people outside of it.398 One unpublished
study found that “non-black hosts earn roughly 12% more” than black hosts
for the equivalent rental and rating, and attributes it to renters’ preference to
rent units from non-black hosts and inaccurate inferences.399 In addition,
some argue that Airbnb only seems to help individuals increase income;
however, in the long run it will actually aggravate the housing crisis by
excluding lower-income individuals from cities.400 More empirical research
is required to see if and to what extent the sharing economy has created the
proverbial public square, and what its possible biases are.401 New data will
help evaluate its possible commercial and privatized aspects.402 For now, its
familiar characteristics point to a vision of an intermediate space and
potential new markets for interaction.403
394. Id.
395. See, e.g., Greg Harman, The Sharing Economy Is Not as Open as You Might Think, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 12, 2014, 11:18 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/
2014/nov/12/algorithms-race-discrimination-uber-lyft-airbnb-peer.
396. See, e.g., Joanna Penn & John Wihbey, Uber, Airbnb, and Consequences of the Sharing
Economy: Research Roundup, JOURNALIST’S RESOURCE (July 13, 2015),
http://journalistsresource.org/studies/economics/business/airbnb-lyft-uber-bike-share-sharingeconomy-research-roundup. “Berlin has banned regular short-term rentals in the most popular parts
of the city without prior permission from the authorities. Paris passed a law in February 2014 to
allow city inspectors to check rental homes whose owners are suspected of renting them out to
visitors illegally.” Id.
397. SAMUEL NADLER, THE SHARING ECONOMY: WHAT IS IT AND WHERE IS IT GOING? 8 (2014),
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/90223#files-area (analyzing the recent history of the sharing
economy and suggests methods for maximizing efficient utilization of items and services).
398. See Edelman & Luca, supra note 14, at 9.
399. Id. at 9–10.
400. Rebecca Burns, The ‘Sharing’ Hype: Do Companies like Lyft and Airbnb Help Democratize
the Economy?, THESE TIMES (Jan. 27, 2014), http://inthesetimes.com/article/16111/the_sharing_
economy_hype.
401. See Cho & Rogel, supra note 196, at 169.
402. See id. at 168–69.
403. Id. at 173.
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The potential of the sharing economy to become an intermediate space
with private and public aspects should not be confused with an anti-capitalist
social agenda.404 Some critics insist that the sharing economy represents
corporate capital that is monetizing a part of the social world that it
previously avoided.405 Because Airbnb is a site that earns profit by charging
a fee on every transaction,406 it is “a new space of capitalist exchange where
it didn’t previously exist or predominate.”407 Turo also charges owners a
25% commission per rental,408 and other car-sharing sites have similarly
high commissions and booking fees.409 However, other sites are less profitdriven, such as NeighborGoods that does not charge a fee,410 and more about
community and solidarity.411
The above critique accentuates the complexity of the phenomenon and
should caution those who view the sharing economy as a manifestation of
socialism.412 Indeed, the commercial and social aspects of the sharing
economy are in constant tension. The sharing economy encompasses a wide
array of practices and transactions, some driven by solidarity and altruism,
while others are essentially business-like transactions.413 Commercial
sharing in intimate locations raises the concern of a world where everything,
including one’s home, is monetized.414 This concern restates the challenge
to the category of consumption property. The new conceptualization of
intermediate space allows individuals to create their own space by

404. See, e.g., Burns, supra note 400.
405. Id.
406. See NADLER, supra note 397, at 39–40. Airbnb takes a fee of 9–15% of the reservation: the
host pays 3%, and the guest pays the rest. Id. at 40.
407. Burns, supra note 400.
408. Carolyn Said, RelayRides Lands $25 Million Funding to Help Car Owners Rent Idle
Vehicles, TECH. CHRONICLES (June 14, 2014, 4:01 AM), http://blog.sfgate.com/techchron/2014/
06/24/relayrides-lands-25-million-funding-to-help-car-owners-rent-idle-vehicles/.
409. See, e.g., Getaround, Inc Fee and Commission Schedule, GETAROUND,
https://www.getaround.com/fees (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
410. See NeighborGoods FAQ, supra note 345.
411. See Mike Pepi, Solidarity After “Sharing:” Notes on Internet Subjects # 1, RHIZOME (June
20, 2014, 1:35 PM), http://rhizome.org/editorial/2014/jun/20/sharing-and-solidarity/ (noting the
distinction between peer economy and solidarity economy).
412. Bauwens, supra note 325, at 131–32.
413. Christoffer O. Hernoes, Sharing Is Everything but Caring in the Sharing Economy, TECH
CRUNCH (Feb. 27, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/02/27/sharing-is-everything-but-caring-in-thesharing-economy/.
414. See id.
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combining different interactions.415 The fact that the home, car, or bike is
partially monetized does not necessarily mean that it has become completely
commodified.416 This may be true,417 but in most cases the intimate and
commercial exist side by side.
Instead of stressing the socialist features of sharing, or the emotional
and economic benefits of sharing per se,418 I argue that the sharing economy
conceivably opens a new intermediate sphere for social interaction.419 How
does this new intermediate space translate into a richer category for
consumption property? One needs to consider property as a spatial
environment that hosts various kinds of relations.420 These relations include
the altruistic gift exchange structure that typifies familial ties and
friendships.421 They also include commercial ties with the greater
community, neighbors, and strangers.422 Yet, unlike typical commercial
transactions, the platform for interaction here is an asset that is purchased
and used for private and personal consumption.423 The core use of the asset
is personal use that contributes to personhood, autonomy, and freedom and
supports intimacy.424 This core should not be disregarded because of the
existence of commercial and quasi-commercial peripheries. At the same
time, one cannot ignore the peripheral commercial aspects altogether.
Instead, a personal asset should be understood as a platform for interaction
that serves as a nexus of connections.
The idea of a nexus of connections creates the potential for individuals
to shape their personal space. Personal assets provide an opportunity to
engage with a variety of people (friends, neighbors and strangers) and also in
415. See supra Part V.
416. Contra Tsilly Dagan, Itemizing Personhood, 29 VA. TAX REV. 93, 109–10 (2009)
(identifying the problems inherent in the commodification of personal items and interactions).
417. See infra notes 518–23 and accompanying text.
418. See Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549, 572–74
(2001) (describing the benefits of sharing).
419. See infra Part VI.
420. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
421. Dagan, supra note 416, at 130 (describing the “mutual benefits” derived from altruistic social
exchange as “expressions of shared understandings, affections, and commitments”).
422. Instead of a set of dichotomies between personal and business, or between commodification
and non-commodification, one needs to explore the normative considerations of a legal problem or
concept. See Tsilly Dagan & Talia Fisher, Rights for Sale, 96 MINN. L. REV. 90 (2011); Dagan &
Heller, supra note 418, at 552–54.
423. See infra Part VI.A.
424. See infra Part VI.A.
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a variety of ways, including altruistic sharing, commercial transaction, and
the many shades of gray in between.425 Indeed, many owners become
involved in collaborative consumption because of economic hardship and
are careful in their sharing decisions.426 Yet, with the range of options
available for individuals facing economic problems, the sharing economy
provides a unique choice. It provides the individual the possibility to define
his personal space based on goals that are important to him, in particular
sustainability and social and environmental justice.427 Personal space
becomes a trajectory to the social, communal, commercial, and ecological
self.
Unlike accounts of property that emphasize social obligation,428 my
point here is that the challenges of the sharing economy to consumption
property are still very much a matter of individual choice. The owner
chooses how to shape his personal space, and he is able to redefine it
whenever he pleases. It is a private property regime that is governed by the
right to exit429 and, to a lesser extent, the right to exclude.430
However, the sharing economy—by choice of the owner—invites other
values as well, including efficiency, sustainability, community, and
cooperation.431 These interests and values stem from the new function of
consumption property and should be considered in the reconstruction of the
category, as the next Part elucidates.
The value of the argument does not lie in its emphasis on context-based
analysis, but rather in adding a new perspective to the metaphor of private
property that is designed for personal use.432
The benefit of this approach is threefold. First, the idea of an
intermediate space is not tied down to the very narrow conception of the

425. See infra Part VI.
426. See supra note 387 and accompanying text.
427. See infra Part VI.
428. See Alexander, supra note 278; Singer, supra note 278; Stern, supra note 87.
429. See Dagan & Heller, supra note 418, at 567–69; Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, The
Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 85–88 (2004).
430. See supra notes 276–77 and accompanying text.
431. See Dagan & Heller, supra note 418, at 572–74.
432. See also Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1369, 1373 (2013) (providing a nuanced property analysis based on justified expectations).
See generally DAGAN, supra note 278 (defining property as a set of social institutions that serve as
default frameworks for interpersonal interaction).
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home and neighborhood.433 It provides a conceptual opportunity to think of
the home as a platform for multiple interactions. Contrary to the pure and
isolated sanctuary that is built within a homogenous community, there is a
possibility of a more diverse, though not entirely heterogeneous and
pluralistic, environment.434 Second, this approach supports autonomy
because it allows people to signal their chosen personality on the spectrum
between private, commercial, and open to others. Third, this approach is
responsive to the new ways in which people are using their property and
allows for flexibility in shaping the rules regarding such consumption
property.435
It goes beyond binary distinctions between full-blown
protection of the home and a non-protective approach and calls for a
nuanced set of rules that apply to this new category in the era of the sharing
economy.436 Conceiving consumption property as a personal space and
platform for interaction thus provides an opportunity for rethinking current
rules that stem from the distinction between private and public or intimate
and commercial.
VI. RETHINKING LEGAL DOCTRINES
The sharing economy is gradually changing practices of consumption,437
and thus it necessarily continues to push the boundaries of consumption
property. It blurs familiar distinctions between intimate property and a place
of business, leading to new questions regarding the scope of legal protection
of intimacy, privacy, and autonomy. Faced with other spatial challenges to
legal categories, several scholars have advocated for dismissing property
categories altogether and replacing it with a focus on relationships and
substantive human interests.438 This Article argues instead that property
categories do matter, and that spatial distinctions may prove valuable.439 Yet

433. See Fox, supra note 91, at 600–01.
434. Cf. Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 891–93 (2007).
435. See LEHAVI, supra note 71, at 179–80 (describing the drawbacks to a classical conception of
property).
436. See Radin, supra note 49, at 978–79.
437. See BUCZYNSKI, supra note 7, at 17.
438. See Rosenbury, supra note 434, at 891–92 (arguing that “the actual location . . . matters
much less than do the actors who engage in the socialization of children in those spaces”); Stern,
supra note 68, at 905 (arguing against strict protection of the home and for replacing an emphasis on
the physical home with an emphasis on private interests and intimate association).
439. See supra Part III.B.
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these categories have to be mindful of the use and function of the property.
Therefore, legal rules should replace the intimate or commercial binary with
a more nuanced approach, even at the cost of reaching conflicting solutions
in different areas of the law.440
The nexus of connection model
acknowledges that the same property can be intimate and commercial and
that regulation, eminent domain, insurance, fair housing, zoning, and public
accommodations laws should treat this hybrid use differently.441 What
seems like a loss in legal coherence442 is actually a distinct understanding of
the category based on the role that intimacy, autonomy, or privacy plays in
each of these doctrines. Once we accept that personal assets have various
functions, we can begin to rethink the role of intimacy, privacy, and
autonomy in crafting legal rules.
Some doctrines remain unfettered by the changes of modern
consumption.443 Eminent domain rules and Fourth Amendment protection
single out consumption property as a source of individual safety, control,
and privacy.444 The home’s purpose, in these cases, is to create a secure
space where one can control his environment.445 The sharing economy, with
its mixture of intimate and commercial aspects, does not fundamentally
challenge the freedom-oriented rationale of these doctrines.446
Yet, the sharing economy transforms the role of intimacy, privacy, and
autonomy in other areas of the law. Legal regulations, such as tax law,
business permits, and insurance codes, often engage in boundary setting
between categories of living.447 Business permits and taxes distinguish

440. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); Aldo Schiavello, On “Coherence” and
“Law”: An Analysis of Different Models, 14 RATIO JURIS. 233, 235 (2001).
441. See infra Part VI.A–.B.
442. See DWORKIN, supra note 440; Schiavello, supra note 440, at 242.
443. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
444. See Barros, supra note 81, at 259; Peñalver, supra note 80, at 2974; Stern, supra note 68, at
913; see also Janice Nadler & Shari Seidman Diamond, Eminent Domain and the Psychology of
Property Rights: Proposed Use, Subjective Attachment, and Taker Identity, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 713, 727 (2008) (discussing personal control in eminent domain).
445. Nadler & Diamond, supra note 444, at 746; see also Fox, supra note 91, at 590 (“[H]ome as
a territory offers security and control, a locus in space, permanence and continuity and privacy.”);
Radin, supra note 49, at 957.
446. See Barros, supra note 81, at 257 (discussing freedom in search and seizures); Katherine M.
McFarland, Privacy and Property: Two Sides of the Same Coin: The Mandate for Stricter Scrutiny
for Government Uses of Eminent Domain, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 142, 155 (2004).
447. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2022–23 (1996).
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between locations and types of activity.448 They regulate actions by creating
a set of incentives that affect economic choices and communicate a social
message regarding the desirability and normative value of a given
practice.449 Rules should thus acknowledge the variety of choices that the
sharing economy provides and allow owners to engage with their property
without classifying the use in one of the two dichotomous possibilities.450 In
the context of a regulation, the law should develop subcategories to allow for
multiple uses of consumption property.451
Lawyers should also rethink the scope of intimate association protection
in property law. Property is a platform for interaction with others,452 and
different types of property beget different types of relations.453 Property
rules allow owners to choose whether and with whom to share their property
in the private sphere but regulate these choices in the public arena.454
Consumption property breeds intimacy and relations based on familial
affection, friendship, and trust.455 Commercial property is a platform for
market transactions based on self-interest and utility.456 This sharp division
has significant legal implications, especially in the case of discrimination.457
Because the sharing economy challenges the distinction, the law of
discrimination has to adapt. As this Part explains, owners can choose a type
of use for their property, which can be a mixture of intimate and
New
commercial, but not the legal ramifications of said use.458
subcategories should be based on the type of use, the preferences of the
owner, and the nature of interaction.
The changing form of consumption property affects the community as
well.459 If people open up their homes, their cars, and their personal
belongings to others, their neighbors become exposed to a flow of

448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.

See infra notes 552–60 and accompanying text.
See Dagan, supra note 416, at 105; Dagan & Heller, supra note 418.
Id.
Id.
See generally Nedelsky, supra note 87; Singer, supra note 87.
See generally Singer, supra note 87.
See infra Part VI.A.
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.A.
See infra Part VI.A.1–.2.
See supra notes 449–57 and accompanying text.
See Barros, supra note 81, at 289.
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strangers.460 They are forced to give up their intimacy.461 On the one hand,
zoning laws have to be mindful of the freedom of individuals to
commercially share their consumption property by supporting efficiency,
sustainability, and integration.462 On the other hand, zoning laws must be
mindful of the possible negative externalities for the neighborhood.463
The rationales for protecting intimacy in consumption property are
varied. Each of these examples employs a different aspect of this protection
and is distinctively challenged by the sharing economy phenomenon. The
answer lies in targeting the specific challenge in any given doctrine and
reconstructing the category accordingly. In doing so, one must engage with
the values, purposes, and interests that the sharing economy promotes
because these interests complicate the treatment of intimacy, privacy, and
autonomy.464 In the previous Part, three main values and interests were
discussed: efficiency, a platform for interaction, and sustainability.465
In order to demonstrate the usefulness of this nuanced approach and
provide substance to the new understanding of the category, this Part
considers in more depth two sets of legal doctrines: (1) the boundaries of
freedom of intimate association in property transactions, namely fair housing
and public accommodation law;466 and (2) taxation and regulation of
consumption property in the era of the sharing economy.467 The purpose of
these examples is twofold: First, to add an important perspective to current
debates that is particularly relevant to the sharing economy. Second, to
demonstrate the limits of contemporary binaries. I do not, however, intend
to offer a comprehensive account of the issues nor suggest new rules for
immediate consideration.
A. Consumption Property, Intimacy, and Equality
The legal protection of intimacy becomes complicated when the

460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
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See ZELIZER, supra note 253, at 213–14.
Id.
See supra notes 216–27 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 228–32 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., ZELIZER, supra note 253, at 213–14.
See supra Part V.
See infra Part VI.A.1.
See infra Part VI.B.
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property is used personally but at the same time is open to the public.468 In
the sharing economy, do owners enjoy freedom of intimate associations?
The protection of intimacy in the law is complex and has different
manifestations in different contexts.469 This Part discusses a specific legal
question within the context of intimacy and property law.470 It concerns the
owner’s prerogative to choose with whom to share her property.471
Generally, an owner can decide who she wants to invite to her home for
dinner, to lend her car to, or to trade her gardening tools or books with.472
This model of ownership and intimacy is based on the much-discussed right
to exclude, which allows owners to exclude others from engaging with the
owner’s property.473 Although some scholars characterize the right to
exclude as fundamentally social,474 conceptual theories of exclusion focus on
the right of the individual to exert control over her property. In other words,
she is the “supreme agenda setter for the resource.”475
However, the prerogative to choose cooperative interaction is also
supported by a broader conception of property law.476 According to scholars
that emphasize the social and relational aspects of ownership, property
cannot be adequately understood and theorized without considering the ways
people share property and cooperate in property-related projects.477 Indeed,
sharing that successfully builds on cooperation with others strengthens
interpersonal relations and is good in and of itself.478 People enjoy
468. Cf. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 626 (1980);
Nancy Catherine Marcus, The Freedom of Intimate Association in the Twenty First Century, 16 GEO.
MASON U. C.R. L.J. 269, 274 (2006) (emphasizing the legal protection of intimate association as a
private and personal right).
469. See Marcus, supra note 468, at 274–75; see also Karst, supra note 468.
470. See infra notes 472–13 and accompanying text.
471. See infra notes 472–13 and accompanying text.
472. See Tim Iglesias, Does Fair Housing Law Apply to “Shared Living Situations”? Or, the
Trouble with Roommates, 22 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 111, 115 (2014)
(“We do not apply antidiscrimination norms to whom you invite to dinner at your home or whom
you befriend.”).
473. See supra notes 276–81 and accompanying text; see also Henry Smith, Property as the Law
of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1693–94 (2012).
474. See James Penner, Ownership, Co-Ownership, and the Justification of Property Rights, in
PROPERTIES OF LAW 166, 166–67 (Timothy Endicott, Joshua Geltzer & Edwin Peel eds., 2006); see
also Merrill & Smith, supra note 276, at 1891–92 (highlighting the social utility in exclusion).
475. Katz, supra note 276, at 278.
476. See infra notes 477–82 and accompanying text.
477. See generally Nedelsky, supra note 87; Rose, supra note 342; Stern, supra note 87.
478. Dagan & Heller, supra note 418, 572–73.
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cooperating, which may foster a sense of unity, trust, or intimacy.479
Choosing to interact with others is therefore a positive attribute of
autonomous ownership, not only a form of negative freedom.480 This
approach is sensitive not only to freedom of association but also to the
importance of relationships and possible responsibilities that stem from such
engagements.
This is all true of property law for intimate locations.481 But when we
discuss a place of business, this prerogative is significantly curtailed. There
are several federal and state laws that restrict the owner’s choice of
association.482 The right to exclude in a commercial context is limited in
order to prevent business owners from discriminating when providing
services.483 The justification for this limitation is that certain “preferences
and habits are not acceptable or conducive in the public realm.”484 When
individuals enter the public space, they are no longer free to choose their
conduct or values.485 In other words, “by opening one’s property to the
public for business purposes, the owner waives a part of her right to
exclude.”486 An alternative justification focuses on protection from market
power.487
This argument is deeply rooted in the dichotomy between intimate and
commercial locations. It is, in essence, a spatial argument that relies on
distinctions between private and open to the public, between intimate and
business.488 The underlying assumption is that there are different audiences
involved. A place of business serves the public, and the home is meant to
479. Id. at 573–74.
480. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 121–72, reprinted in
LIBERTY: INCORPORATING FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 166 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002); see also
DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY 252 (1997) (explaining that property provides space for autonomy and self-realization,
associated with both liberty and personhood).
481. See supra notes 477–80 and accompanying text.
482. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–19 (2012);
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12955 (West 2011); FLA. STAT. §§ 760.20–.60 (2010); HAW. REV. STAT. §
515-3 (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-305 (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41a-4 (2013).
483. Iglesias, supra note 472, at 114–15.
484. Id. at 114.
485. Id.
486. Singer, supra note 45, at 1448.
487. Berle, supra note 2; Peñalver, supra note 77, at 23.
488. See supra notes 482–85 and accompanying text.
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serve household members. Yet the sharing economy, and the changing
patterns of consumption that come with it, challenge this premise. The
challenge calls for a new discussion of the boundaries of intimacy in
property law. It requires thinking about the home, private car, and other
personal possessions as an intermediate space and reconsidering the role of
intimacy in these locations. This Part considers two contemporary debates:
fair housing and public accommodation in personal consumption property.
1. Fair Housing
Recent legal scholarship has struggled with the question of whether
federal and state fair housing acts apply to shared living situations and the
associated advertising.489 First, one must review the legal framework for
housing discrimination. The first important law is the Civil Rights Act of
1866, which prohibits racial discrimination in property transactions.490
According to the Act, all citizens have the same right to “inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.”491 Racial
discrimination in housing is thus illegal with no exemptions.492 Another
significant law is the federal Fair Housing Act that prohibits discrimination
in the sale or rental of housing on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
familial status, or national origin.493 State housing acts occasionally expand
the list of protected groups and make discrimination based on sexual
orientation, source of income, or familial responsibilities illegal.494 Unlike
the Civil Rights Act, the Fair Housing Act of 1968 includes exemptions.495
Most important for this discussion is the so-called Mrs. Murphy
exemption,496 which stipulates that dwellings intended for occupation by
four or fewer families are beyond the reach of the law if the owner lives in
489. Iglesias, supra note 472, at 111; Messerly, supra note 236, at 1951–53; James D. Walsh,
Reaching Mrs. Murphy: A Call for Repeal of the Mrs. Murphy Exemption to the Fair Housing Act,
34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 605, 630 (1999); Kevin M. Wilemon, Comment, The Fair Housing Act,
the Communications Decency Act, and the Right of Roommate Seekers to Discriminate Online, 29
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 375, 377 (2009); Wright, supra note 240, at 1341–42.
490. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2012).
491. Id.
492. See id.
493. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–31 (2012).
494. Messerly, supra note 236, at 1957.
495. § 3603(b).
496. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 101, at 433 (explaining that during congressional deliberation
on the Act, the exemption was discussed as an imagined Mrs. Murphy’s boarding house).
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one of the units.497 The exemption applies to most shared living
arrangements and allows owners to discriminate between potential
roommates.498 Despite this exemption, however, discriminatory advertising
is still prohibited.499 Publishing any statement, notice, or advertisement
based on protected classification is illegal.500 Therefore, while an owner can
discriminate at the door based on sex or religion, she cannot advertise a
discriminating ad based on these criteria.501
This framework is the legal background for a recent Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals decision.502 In Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommate.com, L.L.C.,503 the court had to decide whether the Fair Housing
Act applies to a commercial website that helps people find roommates.504
The website required users to disclose information about their sex, sexual
orientation, and familial status and matches potential roommates
accordingly.505 The Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley claimed
that this requirement violated the Fair Housing Act.506 Because the Act
makes it illegal to “make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or
published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or
rental of a dwelling”507 that is discriminatory, the court had to interpret the
meaning of the term “dwelling” and determine whether it applies to shared
living arrangements.508 In its opinion, the court read dwelling to mean an
independent housing unit.509 Any other interpretation would, according to
the court, deprive people of their constitutional right to intimate

497. § 3603(b)(2); see also Walsh, supra note 489 (describing the Mrs. Murphy exemption and its
background).
498. Messerly, supra note 236, at 1959. Messerly points out that large-scale shared living
arrangements, such as communes or larger houses, would not fall within the boundaries of this
exemption. Id. at 1959 n.75.
499. § 3604(c).
500. Id.; Messerly, supra note 236, at 1959.
501. § 3604(c).
502. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, L.L.C., 666 F.3d 1216, 1216
(9th Cir. 2012).
503. Id.
504. Id.
505. Id. at 1218.
506. Id.
507. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2012) (emphasis added).
508. Fair Hous. Council, 666 F.3d at 1220.
509. Id. at 1222.
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association.510 This right includes “the freedom to enter into and carry on
certain intimate or private relationships.”511
The court’s analysis goes beyond the issue of advertising and stresses
the importance of intimacy in the home and the inevitable compromise of
privacy when living with others:
Aside from immediate family or a romantic partner, it’s hard to
imagine a relationship more intimate than that between roommates,
who share living rooms, dining rooms, kitchens, bathrooms, even
bedrooms . . . . The home is the center of our private lives.
Roommates note our comings and goings, observe whom we bring
back at night, hear what songs we sing in the shower, see us in
various stages of undress and learn intimate details most of us prefer
to keep private. Roommates also have access to our physical
belongings and to our person.512
This perception of intimacy is entangled with privacy, or rather with the
access of people to the private lives of their roommates.513 Indeed, both
supporters and critics of the court’s approach share the focus on intimacy.514
While supporters highlight intimacy as an inescapable element of living with
others,515 critics stress the wide variety of shared living arrangements516 and
emphasize, in a similar vein, the business aspects of roommate
agreements.517 People typically live with roommates in order to save costs
510. Id.
511. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987).
512. Fair Hous. Council, 666 F.3d at 1221.
513. ZELIZER, supra note 253, at 213.
514. See, e.g., Iglesias, supra note 472, at 133 (critiquing the court’s approach, arguing that it
ignores the commercial aspects of the transaction); Messerly, supra note 236, at 1965–68
(supporting the position that the right of choice in shared living is based on the right to privacy and
intimate association); Wright, supra note 240, at 1355–56 (“Home is a sanctuary where privacy is
expected and because most intimate associations are centered in the home.”).
515. See Messerly, supra note 236, at 1978 (“The right to choice acknowledges that the
roommate-housemate relationship has the potential to become a deep, intimate relationship where
mutual support, companionship, and trust play integral parts.”); Wright, supra note 240, at 1355–57
(stressing the importance of intimacy in the home).
516. See Iglesias, supra note 472, at 127–30 (indicating that there are four common types of
roommate relationships: independent living, which is purely commercial; compatibility; active
companion; and intimate companionship).
517. Walsh, supra note 489, at 613 (asserting that by publicly renting one is involved in a
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or earn money as part of a commercial transaction.518
The sharing economy reveals a continuum of possibilities between the
two extremes that the current binary view fails to appreciate.519 Instead, the
law should employ subcategories that focus on the type of use, the owner’s
preferences, and the nature of the interaction with users.
First, the use of property has to preserve a core of intimacy for the
property to be regarded as a home, a private car, or any other personal
consumption property.520 It cannot be purely commercial.521 A host that
rents out an apartment that he does not live in is not opening up his personal
space. The apartment is simply business property. In this sense, the New
York distinction mentioned earlier is perfectly logical.522 According to New
York regulations, only owners or tenants that are living in the property can
legally rent their apartments for short periods of time.523
This brings us to the Mrs. Murphy exemption524 and how it applies to
the sharing economy. This exemption has been forcefully criticized because
it is much too wide to protect intimacy in the home.525 A landlord that rents
out four units does not necessarily interact with her tenants. The problem
with this critique is that in extenuating the business aspect of the transaction,
it often ignores other aspects of the use of property.526 The nexus of
connections offers a new perspective for thinking about this exemption.527
Unlike a binary set of categories, a perception of personal space allows us to
think of the home as an open environment for interaction without reducing it
to a place of business.
business).
518. Iglesias, supra note 472, at 121.
519. Id. (noting that the court in Roommate.com only mentioned the business aspect twice).
520. See generally Messerly, supra note 236, at 1961–64 (emphasizing the right to privacy and
that “privacy and property unite in the context of shared living”).
521. See Walsh, supra note 489, at 608 (“The relationships involved in [rental] situations are
clearly and unmistakably of a much closer and more personal nature than in the case of major
commercial establishments.” (quoting BERNARD SCHWARTZ, 2 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS 1194 (1970))).
522. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 4 (McKinney 2011).
523. Id.
524. See Messerly, supra note 236, at 1959.
525. See Walsh, supra note 489, at 606 (“Congress drew the line in the wrong place, rendering the
exemption over-inclusive as a protector of liberty.”).
526. See, e.g., id.; Iglesias, supra note 472, at 127–28 (recognizing the possible different types of
roommate relationships, but emphasizing the commercial aspects of “independent living” or
“compatibility”).
527. See supra Part VI.
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In the context of discrimination, a new platform for interaction with
others is particularly important. Because the sharing economy opens up a
new sphere of interaction and exchange, discrimination based on race,528
color, religion, familial status, or national origin undermines this purpose
and the values it stands for. The power of this phenomenon lies in its
potential for connecting people of different age groups, income levels, sexes,
and races within the context of a private and intimate setting. On the other
hand, the possibility of connectivity should not distract us from the personal
dimension of the property and the importance of intimacy, security, and
safety in the home. Therefore, when a woman living alone does not feel
comfortable renting a room to a man because she fears for her personal
safety, the personal dimension of the property becomes prominent.529
The specific balance of intimacy and diverse interaction is intricate.
Owners have substantially different uses and preferences for their
property.530 The nexus of connection model stresses the owner’s ability to
choose how to shape her personal space, but not the legal implications of
said choice. People can choose a very intimate and secluded space or
instead opt for an intermediate space where the personal and commercial
aspects of the property coexist.531
In the sharing economy, personal spaces can be characterized by
significant commercial aspects and can be open to the public in a way that
calls for rethinking the Mrs. Murphy exemption.532 Although this Article
does not claim to be a conclusive argument, intimacy can no longer serve as
an all-inclusive exemption.533 A more nuanced approach might consider the
frequency of sharing transactions and the intensity of the interaction. Some
owners rent out a room in the house they currently live in and share their
living room, kitchen, and bathroom with guests.534 Others rent out their
528. See supra notes 493–500 and accompanying text.
529. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12927(c)(2)(B) (2015) (allowing for advertisements that
“imply that the housing being advertised is available only to persons of one sex” in cases where
sharing living areas in a single unit are involved).
530. See supra Part III.C.
531. See supra note 472 and accompanying text.
532. See also Walsh, supra note 489, at 614–16 (suggesting that the Mrs. Murphy exemption
should not apply when it is a mere “collection of persons”).
533. See id.
534. See generally Tomio Geron, Airbnb Had $56 Million Impact on San Francisco: Study,
FORBES (Nov. 9, 2012, 3:00 AM), http://forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2012/11/09/study-airbnb-had56-million-impact-on-san-francisco/ (“Airbnb hosts made an average of $9,300 annually for listing a
home and $6,900 for listing a private room or shared space.”).
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home only when they are on vacation. If a room in the home is routinely
rented to guests, and if it is a fairly separate unit, then the open-to-the-public
elements are prominent.535 Similarly, a room that is rarely rented out to
strangers and where houseguests effectively live with the owners makes a
stronger case for intimacy.536 To sum up, the model insists that an analysis
should focus on the purpose and characteristics of the project, rather than
simply applying a dichotomy between private and commercial use. The law
should develop subcategories based on the type of use and frequency of
interaction, the owner’s preferences, and the nature of the interaction with
users.
2. Public Accommodation
A consideration of public accommodation law complements the fair
housing analysis by applying the argument to a broader market. Although
some of the provisions in public accommodation law affect housing,537 the
focus in this subpart is on rental markets. Public accommodation law
generally prohibits discrimination against protected classes in places that are
open to the public and accept or solicit the patronage of the general public.538
The term “public accommodation” was devised by drafters of discrimination
laws to separate the public sphere from more private places, such as schools,
workplaces, and homes.539
State and federal public accommodation laws differ in the list of
protected classes, the list of places and markets that count as public
accommodations, and the remedies available.540 Several state laws include
535. See supra notes 486–89 and accompanying text.
536. Cf ELLICKSON, supra note 90, 263–64 (discussing the benefits of having a trustworthy
relationship with the landlord).
537. An interesting discussion is whether Airbnb hosts are, in fact, operating a hotel because they
provide short-term rentals of housing units. Yet according to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, “a
building which contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by
the proprietor of such establishment as his residence” is exempt. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1) (2012).
538. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272 § 92A (2014) (banning owners of public
accommodations use of advertisements “intended to discriminate against or actually discriminating
against persons of any religious sec, creed, class, race, color, denomination, sex, sexual orientation . .
. nationality, or because of . . . any physical or mental disability”).
539. See Lisa Gabrielle Lerman & Annette K. Sanderson, Comment, Discrimination in Access to
Public Places: A Survey of State and Federal Public Accommodations Laws, 7 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 215, 217–18 (1978).
540. Id.

118

[Vol. 43: 61, 2015]

Consumption Property in the Sharing Economy
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

rental establishments541 or a broad definition of public accommodations that
may include the rental market.542 Yet these laws still employ exemptions
and limitations.543 The pertinent New Jersey law explains that “[n]othing
herein contained shall be construed to include or to apply to any institution,
bona fide club, or place of accommodation, which is in its nature distinctly
private.”544
Should these laws apply to a person renting her car through Turo,
Getaround, or JustShareIt? Should it apply to people renting out their drills,
bikes, or gardening tools through NeighborGoods? As the previous subpart
explained, the sharing economy challenges the dichotomy of open to the
public and private. Under current law, an argument can be made that renting
out one’s own car occasionally is not an instance of public accommodation.
Moreover, enforcing public accommodation laws will arguably deter
individuals from engaging in a resource-saving and environmentally friendly
activity.545
We must rethink current property distinctions and consider a richer
analysis of the values involved in the nexus of connection model. Rather
than suggest a comprehensive solution, this Article encourages scholars to
rethink the basic premise of the problem and employ a wider set of
categories and values. First, the values of sustainability and efficiency are
especially important with regard to cars.546 Cars are underutilized in current
modern reality, leading to heavy traffic, pollution, and high-density levels.547
When owners a priori limit certain transactions based on race, class, or
gender, they are limiting consumers’ ability to use—rather than own—
property and thereby indirectly damage the goals of sustainability and

541. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272 § 92A; NEV. REV. STAT. § 651.050 (2007).
542. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(1) (West 2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.403 (2013); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9, § 4502 (2007). But see Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in
Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 821 n.13 (1991) (“State civil and human rights
statutes also fail explicitly to protect either women or blacks from discrimination in the sale of
consumer goods and services.”).
543. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 includes an exemption for particular types of hotels. See supra
note 537 and accompanying text; see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 651.050.
544. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(l).
545. See Richard A. Epstein, Public Accommodations Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Why
Freedom of Association Counts as a Human Right, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1277–87 (2014)
(discussing public accommodations in small business).
546. See Cho & Rogel, supra note 196, at 168.
547. See id. at 167.
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efficient use.548 Second, changing patterns of consumption could eventually
lead to an important amount of public interaction within the private sphere.
Some individuals choose to shape their property as an intermediate space
that is partially open to the public. The potential of such spatiality depends
on their inclusiveness and connectivity. The platform for interaction
consideration stresses the symbolic harms of discrimination.549 According to
these values, the frequency of rental transactions and the identity of the
people that use the property are important guidelines. When an individual
rents out his car every Thursday to complete strangers, he is engaging in the
public space more than an individual that occasionally rents out his car to
mostly neighbors and acquaintances.
B. Taxation and Regulation
Various tax codes and local regulations have attempted to regulate the
sharing economy phenomenon. Some of these regulations are based on a
strict distinction between the home and the hotel and between personal
consumption and commercial use.550 Others offer a more nuanced
approach.551 I will give one example of each strategy. First consider, for
example, the fairly recent statement by Airbnb that it will collect and remit a
14% hotel occupancy fee in San Francisco.552 The transient occupancy tax is
collected from all Airbnb transactions in the area, provided the reservation is
for twenty-nine nights or shorter.553 This statement complies with article 7
of the San Francisco Business and Tax Regulations Code.554 According to
the Code, a transient occupancy tax applies to hotels or guest rooms.555 A
hotel is defined as “[a]ny structure . . . containing guest rooms and which is
occupied, or is intended or designated for occupation, by guests, whether

548. See Margareta Drzeniek Hanouz, Why Discrimination Is Bad for Business, AGENDA (Mar. 6,
2015), https://agenda.weforum.org/2015/03/why-discrimination-hurts-competitiveness/.
549. See Singer, supra note 45, at 1448; supra note 486 and accompanying text.
550. See infra notes 558–61 and accompanying text.
551. See infra notes 562–63 and accompanying text.
552. See Kerr, supra note 193.
553. See id.
554. See S.F., CAL., BUSINESS AND TAX REGULATIONS CODE art. 7, § 501(g) (2015) (noting a
permanent resident is a person who has occupied “any guest room in a hotel for at least 30
consecutive days”).
555. Id. §§ 501–04.

120

[Vol. 43: 61, 2015]

Consumption Property in the Sharing Economy
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

rent is paid in money, goods, labor, or otherwise.”556 The definition
highlights the main use of a structure and appears to single out large and
small commercial hotels.557 Yet, according to the new arrangement for
Airbnb users, even hosts that rent out a room for only a few nights a year
will be considered hotels for the purpose of the tax.558 The frequency of
sharing transactions and their characteristics are not even considered in
collecting the tax.559 The owners’ use and preferences in shaping the
contours of their property are not considered. In the dichotomy between
home and hotel, this arrangement classifies all sharing economy transactions
as purely commercial. The nexus of connection model requires a more
nuanced arrangement, one that is sensitive to the characteristics of the
property, the type of use, and the frequency and nature of sharing
transactions.560 Although tax rules require simple and clear guidelines,561
this Article encourages policymakers to consider these criteria in devising a
rule.
A different example draws on the regulation of business licenses in local
governments. Generally, in considering insurance rules or business permits,
lawyers have to recognize the economic and ecological contribution of the
sharing economy.562 Restrictive regulations may result in a chilling effect,
limiting the efficient use of personal consumption property.563 On the other
hand, negative externalities regarding safety, cleanliness, and density are
also important.564
In Grand Rapids, Michigan, new regulations allow owners to rent out
rooms via websites such as Airbnb, with several important restrictions.565
556. Id. § 501. Note that the definition does not specify the inclusion of “private residences” but
is otherwise broadly drawn, and includes “any lodginghouse, roominghouse, [and] dormitory.” Id.
557. See id.
558. Kerr, supra note 193.
559. See id.
560. See supra notes 423–27 and accompanying text.
561. Stanley S. Surrey & Gerard M. Brannon, Simplification and Equity as Goals of Tax Policy, 9
WM. & MARY L. REV. 915, 915 (1968) (“It must appear to an observer of the tax scene that
simplification is the most widely quoted but the least widely observed of the goals of tax policy.”).
562. See generally JANELLE ORSI, PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHARING ECONOMY: HELPING
PEOPLE BUILD COOPERATIVES, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE, AND LOCAL SUSTAINABLE ECONOMY (2013)
(discussing the different areas of law that a “sharing lawyer” must know about in today’s society).
563. Cf. Epstein, supra note 545, at 1277–87; supra note 545 and accompanying text.
564. See NADLER, supra note 397, at 8; supra note 397 and accompanying text.
565. See generally GRAND RAPIDS, MICH., CITY CODE tit. V, ch. 61, art. 5, §§ 5.5.01–.05 (2015);
id. tit. VII, ch. 116, art. 7, §§ 7.640–.651.
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An owner must obtain a formal permit.566 In order to get a permit, the
property must be the principal dwelling of the owner during the rental
activity, the license is subject to a fee, only one room can be rented, and all
owners and residents within 300 feet of the property must be notified.567 A
zoning ordinance in Portland, Oregon has adopted similar regulations.568
These regulations strike a balance between competing values.569 They
permit sharing economy transactions while also minimizing negative
externalities. More importantly, they do not fall into the familiar dichotomy
of home and hotel, intimate and commercial.570 The license creates a new
category of a home (the owner must occupy the property) that has an
additional commercial function and is regulated in order to address the
concerns of the nearby community.571 It acknowledges the complexity of
the consumption property category.
These two examples demonstrate the wide range of legal tools available
to local governments and regulators in regulating sharing economy
transactions. Other regulations potentially include zoning laws, consumer
protection laws, and insurance codes.
In the heat of regulation,
policymakers must be careful neither to replicate an outdated conception of
consumption property nor simply reclassify the home as a commercial
enterprise. The nexus of connection model for consumption property offers
more sophisticated solutions that acknowledge the richness of the
consumption property category.

566. See GRAND RAPIDS, MICH., CITY CODE tit. V, ch. 61, art. 5 §§ 5.5.01–.05; see also Josh
Sidorowicz, Airbnb Licensing to Pick up Speed in GR, City Manager Promises Enforcement, FOX 17
W. MICH. (Nov. 13, 2014, 11:25 PM), http://fox17online.com/2014/11/13/airbnb-licensing-to-pickup-speed-in-gr-city-manager-promises-enforcement/.
567. GRAND RAPIDS, MICH., CITY CODE tit. V, ch. 61, art. 5 § 7.6448; see also One-Room ShortTerm Rentals Fact Sheet, CITY OF GRAND RAPIDS, http://grcity.us/city-clerk/Documents/One%
20room%20rental%20fact%20sheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2015).
568. PORTLAND, OR., ZONING CODE §§ 33.207.010–.070 (2015).
569. See §§ 33.207.010–.020.
570. Id. § 33.207.010 (“The regulations are intended to allow for a more efficient use of
residential structures, without detracting from neighborhood character, and ensuring that the primary
use remains residential. In some situations, the operator can take advantage of the scale . . . of a
residence. The regulations also provide an alternative form of lodging for visitors who prefer a
residential setting.”).
571. See id. § 33.207.040(A)(1) (noting the owner must occupy the dwelling “for at least 270 days
during each calendar year”).
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VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has portrayed the challenge posed by the sharing economy
phenomenon to a unique property category. The changing patterns of
consumption in the modern economy are pushing and altering the old
boundaries between commercial and personal consumption property.572
Multiple uses of assets and property create a fragmented, rather than
coherent, concept of personal possessions. This Article has presented a new
way of thinking about the category of consumption property and emphasized
the potential of the sharing economy to create an intermediate space that
allows for connectivity and multiple types of relationships.573
This new framework makes it necessary to rethink various legal
doctrines, some of which have been discussed in this Article.574 Other
doctrines, such as zoning rules and insurance, were not explicitly discussed
but are also unsettled by the challenge to the distinction between business
and intimate, private and open to the public, and may equally require
reconstruction.
However, the challenges of the sharing economy to property law do not
stop at the door of personal consumption property. The sharing economy
holds the potential to revolutionize basic property concepts of acquisition,
ownership, possession, and use rights by ultimately shifting the focus of
property law and challenging its longstanding conventions. This vision has
yet to materialize, but it might be lurking in the shadows, and it definitely
merits reflection. This Article is a first step in grappling with the effect of
the sharing economy on property law and theory.

572. See supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text.
573. See supra Part VI.
574. See supra Part VI.
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